No. 18-11368

IN THE
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit

SHANNON DAVES; SHAKENA WALSTON; ERRIYAH BANKS; DESTINEE TOVAR; PATROBA MICHIEKA; JAMES THOMPSON, On Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated; FAITH IN TEXAS; TEXAS ORGANIZING PROJECT EDUCATION FUND

Plaintiffs-Appellants, Cross-Appellees

v.

DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS; ERNEST WHITE, 194th; HECTOR GARZA, 195th; TERESA HAWTHORNE, 203rd; TAMMY KEMP, 204th; JENNIFER BENNETT, 265th; AMBER GIVENS-DAVIS, 282nd; LIVIA LIU FRANCIS, 283rd; STEPHANIE MITCHELL, 291st; BRANDON BIRMINGHAM, 292nd; TRACY HOLMES, 363rd; ROBERT BURNS, Number 1; NANCY KENNEDY, Number 2; GRACIE LEWIS, Number 3; DOMINIQUE COLLINS, Number 4; CARTER THOMPSON, Number 5; JEANINE HOWARD, Number 6; STEPHANIE FARGO, Number 7 Judges of Dallas County, Criminal District Courts,

Defendants-Appellees, Cross-Appellants

MARIAN BROWN; TERRIE MCVEA; LISA BRONCHETTI; STEVEN AUTRY; ANTHONY RANDALL; JANET LUSK; HAL TURLEY, Dallas County Magistrates; DAN PATTERSON, Number 1; JULIA HAYES, Number 2; DOUG SKEMP, Number 3; NANCY MULDER, Number 4; LISA GREEN, Number 5; ANGELA KING, Number 6; ELIZABETH CROWDER, Number 7; TINA YOO CLINTON, Number 8; PEGGY HOFFMAN, Number 9; ROBERTO CANAS, JR., Number 10; SHEQUITTA KELLY, Number 11 Judges of Dallas County, Criminal Courts at Law,

Defendants-Appellees.

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas, Case No. 3:18-cv-00154-N

BRIEF FOR AMICUS CURIAE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PRETRIAL SERVICES AGENCIES, PRETRIAL JUSTICE INSTITUTE, AND NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR PUBLIC DEFENSE, IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANTS-CROSS APPELLEES

[Counsel listed inside front cover]

Jared B. Caplan
Texas Bar No. 24031913
BRADLEY ARANT BOULT CUMMINGS LLP
600 Travis St., Suite 4800
Houston, Texas 77002
Telephone: (713) 576-0300
Facsimile: (713) 576-0301
jcaplan@bradley.com

J. Bradley Robertson
Candice L. Rucker
Rachel A. Conry
BRADLEY ARANT BOULT CUMMINGS LLP
One Federal Place
1819 Fifth Avenue North
Birmingham, AL 35203-2119
Telephone: (205) 521-8000
brobertson@bradley.com
crucker@bradley.com
rconry@bradley.com

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae

SUPPLEMENTAL CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS

The undersigned counsel of record certifies that the following listed persons and entities as described in the fourth sentence of Rule 28.2.1 have an interest in the outcome of this case. These representations are made in order that the judges of this Court may evaluate possible disqualification or recusal.

The National Association of Pretrial Services Agencies (NAPSA) declares that it is a not-for-profit membership association that has no parent corporation and does not issue publicly held stock.

The Pretrial Justice Institute (PJI) declares that it is a not-for-profit institute that has no parent corporation and does not issue publicly held stock.

The National Association for Public Defense (NAPD) declares that it is a not-for-profit membership association that has no parent corporation and does not issue publicly held stock.

Further, pursuant to Fifth Circuit Rule 29.2, the undersigned counsel certifies that, in addition to the list of interested persons certified in the Appellants-Cross Appellees' Brief and supplemented by the certificates in the subsequent briefs filed with this Court, the following entities and persons may have an interest in the outcome of this case:

Amici

Association of Pretrial Professionals of Florida, Affiliate of NAPSA
California Association of Pretrial Services, Affiliate of NAPSA
Colorado Association of Pretrial Services, Affiliate of NAPSA
Connecticut Pretrial Services, Affiliate of NAPSA
Drug Policy Alliance
Minnesota Association of Pretrial Services
National Association for Public Defense
National Association of Pretrial Services Agencies
New York Association of Pretrial Services Agencies
Ohio Association of Pretrial Services Agencies, Affiliate of NAPSA
Pennsylvania Pretrial Services Association, Affiliate of NAPSA
Pretrial Justice Institute
Prison Policy Initiative, Inc.
Shelby County Tennessee Pretrial Services, Affiliate of NAPSA
South Carolina Association of Pretrial Intervention Programs, Affiliate of NAPSA
Virginia Community Criminal Justice Association, Affiliate of NAPSA

Counsel for Amici
Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP
Jared B. Caplan
Rachel A. Conry
J. Bradley Robertson
Candice L. Rucker

/s/
Jared B. Caplan
Attorney of Record for Amici

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Rules

Other Authorities

STATEMENT REGARDING THE *AMICI CURIAE*[*]

For the past forty years, not-for profit organizations, the National Association of Pretrial Services Agencies (NAPSA) and the Pretrial Justice Institute (PJI) have been dedicated to advancing proven and pragmatic solutions for improving pretrial justice in the United States.

Founded in 1973, NAPSA is a membership association that maintains the Standards of Practice for the pre-trial services profession. NAPSA's membership consists of national and international pretrial practitioners, judges, attorneys, prosecutors, and criminal-justice researchers. Its board contains elected representatives from federal, state, and local pretrial services agencies.

NAPSA's mission is to promote pretrial justice and public safety through rational pretrial decision-making and practices informed by evidence. NAPSA aims to promote the establishment of pretrial agencies nationwide, further research and development on pretrial issues, establish mechanisms for the exchange of information, and increase the pretrial field's professional competence through professional standards and education. NAPSA has exclusively hosted the premier annual pretrial-services training conference for the last 46 years. NAPSA published

[*] Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29, all parties, through their respective counsel, have consented to the filing of this brief. *Amici* certify that no counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in part and that no counsel or party made any monetary contribution toward the brief's preparation and submission.

its first set of Standards on Pretrial Release in 1978. NAPSA revised these standards in 1995, 2004, and 2008 in light of emerging issues facing pretrial decision-makers and changes in practices, technology, case law, and program capabilities. The proposed revised standards call for the elimination of secured financial conditions of release.

PJI's mission is to advance safe, fair, and effective pretrial justice. Its staff are among the nation's foremost pretrial-justice experts. PJI's Board includes representatives from the judiciary, law enforcement, prosecutors, victim advocates, pretrial services, county commissioners, and academia. Founded in 1977, PJI is supported by grants from the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and private foundations. PJI is at the forefront of building stakeholder support for legal and evidence-based pretrial-justice practices. For example, PJI staff served on the task force that drafted the most recent American Bar Association (ABA) Criminal Justice Standards on Pretrial Release. In 2011, PJI partnered with the DOJ to hold a National Symposium on Pretrial Justice. That symposium issued dozens of recommendations for concrete reforms addressing serious deficiencies in the money-based bail system. *See* PJI, *Summary Report of Proceedings of the National Symposium on Pretrial Justice* (May 31, 2011), *available at* https://university.pretrial.org/viewdocument/national-symposium-o (last accessed Jan. 29, 2019) Following the Symposium, DOJ's Bureau of Justice Assistance

assigned PJI to lead a Pretrial Justice Working Group comprised of over 90 justice-system-related organizations and associations, which was responsible for overseeing the implementation of the Symposium's recommendations.

Over the past four decades, NAPSA and PJI have released dozens of publications, conducted hundreds of training sessions, and provided technical assistance to thousands of jurisdictions on enhancing pretrial justice.

The National Association for Public Defense (NAPD) is an association of more than 14,000 professionals who deliver the right to counsel throughout all states and territories in the United States. NAPD's members include attorneys, investigators, social workers, administrators, and other support staff responsible for executing the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. NAPD's members are the defense advocates in jails, courtrooms, and communities. They are experts in both theoretical best practices and practical, day-to-day delivery of indigent-defense services. With respect to the constitutional right to bail, NAPD's members constitute the front-line defenders of the right to be released from custody pending trial, and they observe the collateral damage that occurs in the lives of defendants that remain incarcerated while they are presumed to be innocent. NAPD has an interest in preserving its clients' constitutional right to release pending trial and reforming the bail system in the United States.

ISSUE ADDRESSED BY *AMICI CURIAE*

The amici offer this brief to outline the empirical evidence demonstrating how money bail and non-money alternatives impact legitimate state interests like appearance rates and public safety. The amici seek to provide explanation and context and to support the arguments advanced by the Appellants-Cross Appellees with empirical evidence.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Independent, appropriately controlled scholarship demonstrates that unsecured bonds are a constitutionally sound alternative to the money-based bail system. Effective substitutes for money-based bail successfully achieve the three goals of constitutional bail: maximizing appearance at trial, minimizing harm to the community from the small percentage of high-risk defendants who cannot be safely released, and maximizing pretrial release of those not proven guilty. Pretrial release systems based on secured bonds perform no better than other systems with regard to appearance at trial and community safety. But critically, secured bonds delay or completely prevent the release of individuals who are bailable under the law, increasing pretrial costs and consequences for the innocent, the guilty, and the State. Other states have been able to effectively manage pretrial release and meet the three goals of constitutional bail by utilizing pretrial-supervision programs and evidence-based risk-screening tools.

The secured-bond system, monopolized by the profit-driven commercial-surety industry, runs counter to evidence from credible studies and core constitutional values. This industry props up a flawed system so that it can profit by selling a "service"—guaranteeing, for a non-refundable fee, the appearance of defendants who are statistically as likely (or more likely) to return on their own. This practice financially benefits the industry but fails to advance the legitimate goals

related to bail. Only this rent-seeking industry's advocacy and flawed studies find any virtue in requiring low- and moderate-risk bailable defendants to pay for release from pretrial detention. The benefits flow entirely to the bail-bond industry, making the costs of this system—whether measured in dollars or days in pretrial custody—excessive and unconstitutional.

ARGUMENT

I. The bail process is intended to achieve three legitimate state interests.

Our system has long recognized legitimate state interests that impose pretrial burdens on people who have been accused—but not convicted—of a crime. These legitimate state interests resulted in the traditional concept of bail. Because our constitution specifically forbids excessive bail, however, "liberty is the norm and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception." *United States v. Salerno*, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). Under the constitutional view, "[t]he practice of admission to bail…is not a device for keeping persons in jail upon mere accusation until it is found convenient to give them a trial. On the contrary, the spirit of the procedure is to enable them to stay out of jail until a trial has found them guilty." *Stack v. Boyle*, 342 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring). Legitimate bail systems must promote return for trial, public safety, and pretrial release.

A. Legitimate bail systems must promote return for trial, public safety, and pretrial release.

Our judicial system recognizes that the bail process is meant to effectuate pretrial release while ensuring later appearance and preserving public safety; a constitutional bail system does not necessarily ensure the collection of fines or generate profits for governments or the bail-bond industry. *See id.* at 8. These three legitimate objectives also establish the relevant factors courts weigh when considering bail: the risk that (1) a defendant will fail to return or (2) will endanger

the public before returning for trial, balanced against (3) the right to pretrial release. While these three state interests—return, safety, and release—were historically the focus of the bail process, the shift away to a profit-focused commercial bail system resulted in higher detention rates for pretrial defendants.

Money bail has its root in the Anglo-Saxon criminal justice system, which was mainly comprised of monetary penalties for criminal acts. Timothy R. Schnacke, DOJ, *Fundamentals of Bail: A Resource Guide for Pretrial Practitioners and a Framework for American Pretrial Reform* 23 (2014). England and America eventually adopted a personal-surety system in which a reputable person would take responsibility for the accused and promise to pay the required financial condition if the defendant failed to return. *Id.* at 25.

A key component of the personal surety system was that the surety took on this responsibility without any initial remuneration or promise of future payment. *Id.* But as America grew and communities became larger, the personal-surety system gave way to one that allowed "impersonal" sureties to demand re-payment upon a defendant's default. *Id.*at 26. An "impersonal and wholly pecuniary," for-profit industry emerged, *see Leary v. United States*, 224 U.S. 567, 575 (1912), which requires bailable defendants to pay before being released. This shift resulted in an increase in detention of defendants who were traditionally eligible for bail. Schnacke, *supra,* at 26. This phenomenon is clearly demonstrated here. The District

Court correctly found that "[Dallas] County's post-arrest system automatically detains those who cannot afford the secured bond amounts recommended by the [bail] schedules." ROA.5962. Other conflicting interests distract from the legitimate purposes of bail.

B. Other conflicting interests distract from the legitimate purposes of bail.

The secured bail industry has stymied the return to a more rational, constitutional system—even with respect to low-risk defendants. This industry actively opposes evidence-based reforms, such as the use of unsecured or personal-recognizance bonds that permit bailable defendants to post bond without a pre-release payment and only require forfeiture if the defendant fails to appear. These proven systems produce better, more constitutional results but fail to offer the same commercial opportunities.

The industry's opposition to reform is fierce and well-funded, and its use of flawed, misleading studies to advance its interests is well-documented. *See, e.g.*, DOJ, Bureau of Justice Statistics, *Data Advisory* (March 2010) (cautioning against misuse of certain statistics collected by the Bureau), *available at* www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/scpsdl_da.pdf (last accessed Jan. 29, 2019); Kristin Bechtel, et al., PJI, *Dispelling the Myths: What Policy Makers Need to Know about Pretrial Research* 1, 3–10 (2012) (analyzing secured-bail industry studies that misuse Bureau statistics). Consider, for example, a logically flawed 2004 article

popular with the industry. *See* Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, *The Fugitive: Evidence on Public Versus Private Law Enforcement from Bail Jumping*, 47 J.L. & Econ. 93 (2004). Helland and Tabarrok's article has been discredited for misusing data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics by alleging causation in ways that the Bureau itself has rejected. *See* Bechtel, *supra*, at 7–8. Industry advocates and others continue to cite this discredited article for its conclusions without acknowledging that those conclusions cannot be inferred from the underlying data. *See, e.g.*, Helland & Tabarrok, *The Fugitive*, 47 J.L. & ECON. 93 (2004).

The money-based bail system at issue in this case does not reasonably advance any discernable state interest. Instead, it solely advances the interests of the rent-seeking bail-bond industry.

II. Secured-money bonds do not serve the three legitimate state interests.

Secured-money bonds prejudicially prevent or delay release without reliably advancing the legitimate state interests that bail is intended to address:

- Secured-money bonds do not correlate with higher rates of appearance;
- They do not improve public safety; and
- They *hinder* pretrial release.

Secured bonds thus fail to meaningfully achieve any of the legitimate goals related to bail and succeed only in supporting the bail industry.

A. Secured-money bonds do not correlate with higher rates of appearance for trial.

The District Court properly concluded, in accordance with this Court's conclusions in *ODonnell*, that "secured financial conditions fare no better than unsecured or non-financial conditions at assuring appearance or law-abiding behavior, and that community supervision was actually more effective than pretrial detention." ROA.5970; citing *ODonnell v. Harris Cty. Texas*, 251 F.Supp.3d 1052, 1131–32, 1145 (5th Cir. 2018). Rigorous studies from Colorado, Kentucky, Washington, and elsewhere support this conclusion and stand in stark contrast to the flawed studies promoted by the bail-bond industry.

1. A first-of-its-kind study in Colorado found unsecured bonds offer the same likelihood of court appearance as secured bonds.

In a first-of-its-kind study, researchers collected hundreds of case-processing and outcome variables on 1,970 defendants booked into ten Colorado county jails over a 16-month period and analyzed whether secured bonds were associated with better pretrial outcomes than unsecured bonds. Michael R. Jones, PJI, *Unsecured Bonds: The As Effective and Most Efficient Pretrial Release Option* 6 (2013), *available at* https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=4c57cebe-9456-f26b-49173d0f8b1f03ce&forceDialog=0.

Over 80 percent of Colorado's population resides in the ten participating counties. *Id.* Each local jurisdiction collected data on a pre-determined, systematic, random sampling to minimize bias in selecting defendants. *Id.* Defendants' pretrial risks were assessed and assigned to one of four risk categories. Nearly 70 percent scored in the lower two risk categories. *Id.* This study—unlike the industry's—analyzes pretrial outcomes by risk level to ensure valid comparisons.

The study tracked defendants who received unsecured and secured bonds. *Id.* at 7. Unsecured bonds in Colorado are authorized by statute as "personal recognizance bonds" and do not require defendants to post any money with the court prior to pretrial release. If defendants fail to appear, the court can hold those defendants liable for the full amount of the bond. The Court can also require co-signors on unsecured bonds (like the personal sureties of former years). In contrast, secured bonds require money to be posted with the court on a defendant's behalf prior to pretrial release. *Id.*

The study showed that unsecured bonds offer the same likelihood of court appearance as secured bonds. Fully 97 percent of defendants who were assigned to the lowest risk level and given a personal-recognizance bond attended all future court appearances. *Id.* at 11. Only 93 percent of defendants in the same risk level with a secured bond attended all future court appearances. *Id.* Similarly, in the second risk category, 87 percent of defendants with unsecured bonds attended all

future court appearances. *Id.* Only 85 percent of defendants in the same risk category with a secured bond attended all future court appearances. *Id.* Thus, defendants released on unsecured bonds returned for trial *more* consistently than similar defendants with secured bonds.

2. Recent data from Kentucky and Washington also demonstrates that unsecured bonds are as effective as secured bonds in ensuring court appearance.

Research beyond Colorado also shows that secured bonds are unnecessary to ensure future court appearances. Court appearance rates in Kentucky recently increased when Kentucky reformed its bail process. In 2011, Kentucky passed HB 463, requiring the state pretrial-services division to use an empirically valid risk-assessment instrument to assess defendants' likelihood of returning for trial without threatening public safety. Low-risk defendants were released on their own recognizance unless the court found that release was not appropriate. In the first two years after the law passed, the number of defendants released on unsecured bonds increased from 50 percent to 66 percent while the court appearance rate rose from 89 percent to 91 percent. Administrative Office of the Courts, Kentucky Court of Justice, *Pretrial Reform in Kentucky* 16–17 (2013), *available at* https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=95c0fae5-fe2e-72e0-15a2-84ed28155d0a&forceDialog=0.

Both the Kentucky and Colorado data sets demonstrate that secured bonds are statistically no better than unsecured bonds (and may actually be worse) at ensuring that defendants return to court as promised. The foundation of the money-bail system is statistically invalid.

In Yakima County, Washington, policymakers recently implemented an actuarial pretrial assessment tool—called the Public Safety Assessment ("Yakima PSA")—to provide recommendations regarding supervised pretrial release. Claire M. B. Brooker, *Yakima County, Washington Pretrial Justice System Improvements: Pre- and Post-Implementation Analysis* (2017). At the first appearance, an arrestee was assigned a combined scaled score, determined by the defendant's charges, the local jurisdiction, and resources available for increasing the likelihood of pretrial success. *Id.* at 2. For defendants assigned a high likelihood of pretrial success, the algorithm recommends low-level supervised release. *Id.*

Following the implementation of the Yakima PSA, Yakima County observed a statistically significant increase in the number of arrestees released pretrial with no statistically significant difference in public safety and court appearance outcomes. *Id.* at 6. Use of the Yakima PSA has also decreased the rate of pretrial detention for minority arrestees. *Id.* at 8. Before the Yakima PSA was implemented, there was a disparity in the pretrial release rates by race, with Caucasian arrestees being released

at higher rates. *Id.* Following the implementation of the Yakima PSA, there was no significant difference in release rates among racial and ethnic groups. *Id.*

An empirical analysis of this pretrial assessment also confirmed "that a jurisdiction can reduce pretrial detention and improve racial/ethnic equity by replacing high use of secured money bail with non-financial release conditions guided by actuarial-risk-based decision making, and do so with no harm to public safety or court appearance." *Id.* at 16. Use of the Yakima PSA has also decreased pretrial detention rates for minority arrestees. *Id.*

3. Studies that claim secured bonds are more effective do not adequately control for risk.

Supporters of secured bail often tout studies—usually funded by the for-profit bail industry—that claim secured bonds are more effective than other types of bonds. *See* Bechtel, *supra*, at 6–15 (critiquing flawed studies commonly cited by the for-profit bonding industry). None of the most often cited bail-industry-sponsored studies take the basic analytical step of controlling for risk levels in order to make comparisons between similar defendant populations. *See id.*

In contrast, the Colorado study sorted each defendant using a pretrial risk assessment. This made it possible to accurately compare the failure-to-appear rate of low-risk defendants with that of other low-risk defendants and make a valid comparison between two similarly situated populations. Ignoring the differences between high-, moderate-, and low-risk defendants makes it impossible to credibly

evaluate the effectiveness of secured bonds. High-risk defendants—those who are least likely to return for trial and most likely to threaten public safety if released—are a small percentage of bailable defendants. Generally, statistics on bail outcomes for these defendants "should be interpreted with caution" because high-risk defendants are often only a small and statistically challenging portion of any study. *See, e.g.*, Jones, *supra*, at 10, tbl.3, n.*.

Because the industry studies fail to account for risk, the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the federal agency responsible for collecting the data used by the bail industry in these studies, has specifically warned that this data cannot be used to advocate for one type of pretrial release over another. The Bureau warned in March 2010 that "the data are insufficient to explain causal associations between the patterns reported, such as the efficacy of one form of pretrial release over another." DOJ, Bureau of Justice Statistics, *Data Advisory*, *supra*. The agency explained that in order to determine the most effective type of pretrial release, "it would be necessary to collect information relevant to the pretrial decision and factors associated with individual misconduct." *Id.* Unlike the typical study supporting the money-bail system, both the Colorado and Kentucky studies collected and analyzed such information, validating their conclusions.

B. Secured-money bonds do not correlate with lower rates of pretrial criminal conduct

Secured-money bonds do not meaningfully affect the rate of new criminal activity committed by defendants. Secured-money bonds are not intended to and cannot deter criminal activity during the defendant's pretrial release, because bond forfeiture is predicated on failing to appear in court, not on arrests. Defendants do not forfeit their money bond if they are arrested again. Indeed, the ABA recognizes that financial conditions on release are not appropriate tools for preventing pretrial criminal conduct. ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, *Pretrial Release* § 10-5.3 (3rd ed. 2007). Logic thus suggests that secured bonds are no more effective than other types of release conditions at preventing new pretrial criminal activity, except perhaps as a blunt tool for detaining defendants without regard to actual risk.

The Colorado study confirms this point. It shows no statistical difference between unsecured and secured bonds in preventing criminal activity during the pretrial period. Jones, *supra*, at 10. Only seven percent of defendants in that study's lowest risk group who received an unsecured bond were rearrested for new pretrial crimes compared with ten percent of defendants with a secured bond—a consistent finding across all risk groups. *Id.*

The Kentucky case study likewise shows no positive correlation between secured bonds and public safety. After HB 463 passed, the public safety rate—a rate measuring how often defendants complete pretrial release without being charged

with a new crime—actually improved slightly. *Pretrial Reform in Kentucky*, *supra*, at 17; *see* Kentucky Justice & Public Safety Cabinet, *Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics*, tbl.5.9 (2012) (defining public safety rate), *available at* https://justice.ky.gov/Documents/Sourcebook/Sourcebook2012ChapterFive.pdf . In 2013, as part of the reform started by HB 463, the pretrial services program began using an improved pretrial risk assessment tool. Laura & John Arnold Found., *Results from the First Six Months of the Public Safety Assessment-Court in Kentucky* 3–5 (2014). A study conducted six months after the improved tool was introduced showed the pretrial release rate rose to 70 percent of all defendants and the rate of new criminal activity for defendants on pretrial release declined by 15 percent. *Id.* Thus, secured bonds are neither necessary to promote public safety nor effective at further reducing incidents of new criminal activity.

C. Secured-money bonds excessively and arbitrarily delay or prevent release for indigent defendants, increasing costs for both the State and bailable defendants.

Beyond simply failing to promote court appearance or protect public safety, secured-money bonds and fixed bail schedules directly undermine the primary purpose of bail by delaying or preventing the release of defendants—particularly the poor. Resource-blind bail schedules, like those used in Dallas County, inevitably lead to the detention of people who would be low risk for release but are simply too poor to post the amount required by the schedule. ROA.5961, 8184–8188. Failing to

release bailable defendants not only harms them, it also increases the financial cost to the State through higher pretrial detention rates. Unsecured bonds produce significantly higher release rates, do less harm to bailable defendants, and impose fewer costs on the State.

1. Pretrial detention destabilizes defendants economically and socially.

The costs of secured bonds go beyond direct financial payments. The money-based bail system exacerbates and perpetuates poverty and other sociological stigmas. Predictably, the Colorado study found defendants with secured bonds were detained significantly longer than those with unsecured bonds. Five days of pretrial incarceration passed before defendants with secured bonds achieved the same threshold of 80-percent release that defendants with unsecured bonds achieved on the first day. Jones, *supra*, at 15. This imposes a pre-trial punishment on defendants who—though presumed innocent—are too poor to secure their freedom.

Multi-day pretrial detention poses obvious threats to employment and family stability. See Samuel R. Wiseman, *Pretrial Detention and the Right to Be Monitored*, 123 Yale L.J. 1334, 1356–57 (2014) ("Many detainees lose their jobs even if jailed for a short time, and this deprivation can continue after the detainee's release. Without income, the defendant and his family may fall behind on payments and lose housing, transportation, and other basic necessities.") (internal footnotes omitted). Pretrial detainees "cannot work during the often considerable time they spend in

jail." *Id.* at 1346–47. This loss of income can have an extensive impact on a pretrial detainee's life. *See* Megan Comfort, "*A Twenty-Hour-a-Day Job": The Impact of Frequent Low-Level Criminal Justice Involvement on Family Life*, Ann. Am. Acad. Pol. Soc. Sci. 665:1, 5 (2016). "Jail stays of several weeks are long enough to cause evictions for nonpayment of rent, suspensions of government entitlements such as food stamps and SSI, and the loss of possessions (cars towed, clothing thrown away in homeless shelters, belongings stolen from the street)." *Id.* This is particularly true for poorer defendants, who frequently live paycheck to paycheck, and for parents, who risk losing contact with and custody of their children when they are incarcerated awaiting trial. *See id.* The impact on defendants of these unnecessary, destabilizing events greatly exceeds the value of the fines and bonds collected from low-risk defendants. In fact, this destabilization (*caused* by the money-based bail system) is thought to contribute to an increased risk of failure to appear and new criminal activity—the exact interests the bail system is intended to address. *See* Lowenkamp, *supra*, at 3. Secured bonds thus add cost without benefit. The personal costs to defendants may persist past the conclusion of the case, even if the charges are dismissed.

Even a period as short as 48 hours may economically and socially destabilize an arrestee, making him or her "40 percent more likely to commit new crimes before trial than equivalent defendants held no more than 24 hours." Christopher T.

Lowenkamp, et al. Laura & John Arnold Found., *The Hidden Costs of Pretrial Detention* 3 (2013), *available at* http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/LJAF_Report_hidden-costs_FNL.pdf; *see also Cty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin*, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991).

2. Pretrial detention correlates with higher failure to appear rates.

Even brief periods of pretrial incarceration associated with secured bonds negatively impact rates of appearance and re-offense. Another study using Kentucky's historical data determined that even a short delay in release of bailable individuals correlated with a significant increase in failure to appear. *See* Lowenkamp, *supra*, at 17–18. After controlling for relevant factors including risk level, the researchers found statistically significant decreases in appearance rates for low- and moderate-risk defendants related to delayed pretrial release. *Id.* at 4, 13. When compared with those released within a day, bailable low-risk defendants detained for as few as two to three days were 22 percent more likely to miss future proceedings. *Id.* at 15.

3. Pretrial detention correlates with higher rates of pretrial criminal activity.

The same study found that "the longer low-risk defendants were detained, the more likely they were to have new criminal activity pretrial." *Id.* at 17. When compared with those released within a day, bailable low-risk defendants detained

for as few as two to three days were 39 percent more likely to engage in criminal activity while awaiting trial. *Id.* Moderate-risk bailable defendants showed a smaller, but still significant, increase in reported pretrial criminal activity. *Id.* These results may follow from the loss of jobs, transportation, and housing that can occur when pretrial detention prevents a defendant from working or meeting other commitments. *See* Wiseman, *supra*, at 1356–57. In sum, evidence correlates secured bail with measurably poorer outcomes in the metrics that should be driving bail decisions.

4. Pretrial detention results in higher costs to the State.

The extended pretrial detention associated with secured bonds also increases financial costs to the State. *See generally* Criminal Justice Section, *State Policy Implementation Project*, ABA 2, *available at* http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/criminal_justice/spip_pretrialrelease.authcheckdam.pdf (last accessed Jan. 29, 2019) (comparing costs of pretrial detention with noncustodial supervision). While bail is designed to move bailable defendants out of expensive pretrial detention, defendants who cannot afford secured bail remain in custody, increasing costs to the State.

A recent study by the DOJ's Office of the Federal Detention Trustee quantified State costs associated with pretrial detention. Like the Colorado study, this study sorted defendants into risk levels, utilizing five risk levels rather than four. It then analyzed the costs associated with pretrial detention and the Alternatives to

Detention Program (ATD). ATD includes options such as computer monitoring, third-party custody, and mental health treatment.[1] The study found the average cost of pretrial *detention* for all five risk levels was between $18,768 and $19,912 per defendant based on an average daily cost of $67.27 and average pretrial detentions ranging from 279 to 296 days. In contrast, the average cost of the ATD program was $3,860 per defendant including the costs of supervising the pretrial defendant, the alternatives to detention, and fugitive recovery. Marie VanNostrand, DOJ, Office of the Fed. Detention Trustee, *Pretrial Risk Assessment in Federal Court* 34–36 (2009). On average, detention is between *four and six times more expensive* than the alternatives, even after factoring in costs related to recovering defendants who do not return on their own. *See id.* Reducing pretrial detention rates therefore, significantly decreases the cost to the State by decreasing the number of expensive pretrial detainees.

[1] NAPD does not take a position as to whether these or other pretrial detention alternatives are constitutional or valid in any particular case. Its members reserve the right to challenge the appropriateness of specific detention alternatives in individual cases. Nonetheless, NAPD does agree that, on a systemic level, there are less invasive, less burdensome, and more efficacious alternatives to imposing money bail on pretrial defendants.

III. The experience of professionals who do not have a vested financial interest in secured-money bonds confirms the conclusions of these empirical studies.

Judges, other neutrals, and advocates on both sides of the criminal justice system who engage the empirical data presented in this brief consistently find that it conforms to their experience with the pretrial system. The American Judges Association agrees that pretrial detention decisions "have a significant, and sometimes determinative, impact on thousands of defendants and communities every day" and that defendants who are detained "solely because they cannot afford to pay for their release" bear an increased risk of adverse outcomes. American Judges Association, Resolution 2 (2017), *available at* http://www.amjudges.org/pdfs/AJA-Pretrial-Resolution.pdf. Accordingly, the American Judges Association calls for "the adoption of evidence-based risk assessment and management," the elimination of "practices that cause defendants to remain incarcerated solely because they cannot afford to pay for their release," and "the elimination of commercially secured bonds at any time during the pretrial phase." *Id.*

The judges are not alone in recognizing the results of this empirical data in their professional practice; instead, they are in "some very good and credible company." Conference of State Court Administrators, *2012–2013 Policy Paper Evidence-Based Pretrial Release* 10 (2013), *available at*

https://cosca.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/COSCA/Policy%20Papers/Evidence%20Based%20Pre-Trial%20Release%20-Final.ashx (listing major adopters of empirically supported pretrial practices). The National Association of Counties also recognizes the utility of evidence-based risk assessment and the need to "eliminate practices that cause defendants to remain incarcerated even for a few days solely because they cannot afford to pay for their release." National Association of Counties, *Resolution on Improving Pretrial Justice Process* (2017), *available at* http://www.naco.org/sites/default/files/attachments/Final%20Adopted%20Interim%20Resolutions%20-%202017%20Legislative%20Conference.pdf.

Law enforcement organizations also recognize that this empirical data quantifies and offers solutions to problems that are borne out in their members' experiences. Sheriffs are troubled by a system in which most pretrial inmates are detained "not because of their risk to public safety or of not appearing in court, but because of their inability to afford the amount of their bail bond." National Sheriffs' Association, Resolution 2012-6 (June 18, 2012), *available at* https://www.sheriffs.org/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/2012resolutions/2012-6%20Pretrial%20Services.pdf.

IV. Legitimate state interests are better served by approaches proven successful elsewhere.

Other successful approaches to pretrial release without financial conditions put the secured-money-bond system into context, revealing it as a failed deviation

from traditional bail systems. Those approaches eliminate the damage done by secured-money-bond systems and restore constitutional values in which "liberty is the norm[] and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception." *Salerno*, 481 U.S. at 755. Evidence shows that personal-recognizance bonds are an effective tool for most bailable defendants.

A. Pretrial supervision has been shown to be effective with bailable individuals in all risk levels.

Community-based support is effective for managing low- and moderate-risk defendants without imposing financial conditions of release. While secured bonds delay or prevent release, they do not fundamentally alter the consequences of violating the conditions of release. New charges under either type of bond will result in revocation and detention. Whether bonds are secured or unsecured, defendants who fail to appear may be required to forfeit money. Jones, *supra*, at 10–11. The relevant question for the judge, therefore, is: What conditions on bail might improve the outcomes for defendants at what risk profiles?

A 2013 study drawing from historical data in two states identified statistically significant correlations between pretrial supervision—a common condition of release in which defendants meet and communicate regularly with a supervising officer—and improvements in court appearance rates of defendants released on bail. Christopher T. Lowenkamp & Marie VanNostrand, Laura & John Arnold Found., *Exploring the Impact of Supervision on Pretrial Outcomes* 10, 14–17 (2013). The

study indicates that "the effect of pretrial supervision [on appearance rates] appears to matter even more as risk level increases," especially for moderate- and higher-risk defendants who were 38 percent and 33 percent less likely to fail to appear when supervised during their release. *Id.* at 15.

B. Risk assessment tools are available and effective.

Risk-assessment tools are valuable for distinguishing low-risk defendants from higher-risk defendants so a judge may determine appropriate, individually tailored release conditions for each defendant.[2] Evidence-based risk assessment has recently advanced dramatically such that courts may now reliably assess risk and minimize conflict with the constitutional rights related to pretrial release. PJI, *Pretrial Risk Assessment: Science Provides Guidance on Assessing Defendants* 4–5 (2015), available at https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=23a6016b-d4b3-cb63-f425-94f1ab78a912&forceDialog=0. Screening tools developed in multiple jurisdictions—including Virginia, Ohio, Kentucky, and Colorado—and validated through rigorous study have discredited prior assumptions about the factors that predict a defendant's risk to the community and risk of non-appearance in court. *Id.*;

[2] While NAPD agrees that risk-assessment tools can be effective, depending on how they are designed and applied to an individual defendant, it does not endorse any particular risk-assessment tool and has not taken a position on whether such tools are a constitutionally adequate remedy for flawed state-court bail systems. Accordingly, NAPD does not join this section of the brief.

see, e.g., PJI, *The Colorado Pretrial Assessment Tool (CPAT) Revised Report* 19–20 (2012).

1. National data sets allow reliable, nondiscriminatory risk assessment with minimal expense.

The data in this area is vast, and it provides state and local governments of any size with reliable tools for determining a defendant's risk level. One such tool, the PSA, provides a validated risk assessment based on "a database of over 1.5 million cases drawn from more than 300 U.S. jurisdictions." Laura & John Arnold Found., *Public Safety Assessment: Risk Factors and Formula*, *available at* https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=96b14899-4d9b-0e46-5de2-3761d945f31b&forceDialog=0 (last accessed Jan. 29, 2019). The data-driven process used to create the PSA identified nine administrative factors based on current charges and criminal history that reliably predict risk of new crime, new violence, and failure to appear. After accounting for those administrative factors, the authors determined that none of the interview-dependent factors—including "employment, drug use, and residence"—improved predictions. Laura & John Arnold Found., *Developing a National Model for Pretrial Risk Assessment* 4 (2013), *available at* https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=794208cc-3e92-23fe-40a7-6f02885b01a0&forceDialog=0 (last accessed Jan. 29, 2019).

As compared with unsubstantiated or discriminatory heuristics for estimating risk associated with pretrial release, the PSA is "more objective, far less expensive, and requires fewer resources to administer." Laura & John Arnold Found., *Annual Report* (2014), available at https://www.arnoldventures.org/annual-reports/2014-annual-report (last accessed Jan. 29, 2019). Courts using the PSA can make reliable predictions by focusing on criteria already available from charging documents and prior criminal records. Eliminating extraneous information—including race, gender, level of education, and socioeconomic status—the tool both reduces the need for intensive and expensive pre-trial bail interviews and presents courts with a cleaner distillation of the factors relevant to legitimate state interests. Laura & John Arnold Found., *Public Safety Assessment: Risk Factors and Formula*, *supra.*

2. Individual states have been able to tailor risk assessment to statutory requirements.

Several states, including Virginia and Ohio, employ objective tools tailored to statutory criteria governing pretrial release. Virginia developed and validated a pretrial risk assessment instrument tailored to its statutory requirements. Marie VanNostrand & Kenneth J. Rose, *Pretrial Risk Assessment in Virginia* 1 (May 1, 2009). The Virginia validation study analyzed a year's worth of records from five representative counties and identified a set of statistically significant predictors of negative outcomes including failure to appear, new arrests, and criminal allegations prior to trial. *Id.* at 2.

Ohio followed a similar process in developing several tools for pretrial assessment and other risk inquiries related to recidivism. *See* Edward Latessa, et al., *Creation and Validation of the Ohio Risk Assessment System Final Report* ii, 13 (2009). The Ohio initiative demonstrated the value of these assessment tools not only for managing pretrial release, but also for addressing community supervision, institutional intake for convicted defendants, and community re-entry following incarceration.

State and local governments thus have abundant options for effectively and efficiently managing pretrial release without imposing a burden that adds cost to the accused and the state itself.

3. Pretrial risk assessments are more effective than bail schedules.

The rise of objective, evidence-based assessment tools is precisely why bail schedules should be rejected. Recognizing the importance of individual risk assessment, the ABA "flatly rejects the practice of setting amounts according to a fixed bail schedule based on charge." Commentary to ABA Pretrial Release Standard 10-5.3(e), p. 113. Such schedules exclude consideration of factors that may be far more relevant than the charge. *Id.*

In addition, the use of such schedules inevitably leads to the detention of persons who pose little threat to public safety but are too poor to afford release while releasing others that pose a higher safety risk but can afford to post bond. For this

reason and others, the International Association of Chiefs of Police adopted a resolution criticizing the use of bail schedules and calling for the use of pretrial risk assessments to increase public safety and reduce release of individuals that may pose a threat. International Association of Chiefs of Police, *supra*. In sum, evidence-based, objective pretrial risk assessments are more effective than bail schedules at serving legitimate state interests.

CONCLUSION

Any disinterested review of the relevant data shows that secured-money bail is ineffective and counter-productive at achieving the legitimate goals of maximizing release, maximizing court appearance, and minimizing public risk. The practice hinders release of bailable defendants and shows no statistically significant positive impact on any other valid metric. Its only reliable function is to provide the bail bond industry with a literally captive market. This Court should reverse, in part, the District Court's judgment, consistent with Appellants-Cross Appellees' arguments, and should modify the District Court's preliminary injunction accordingly.

Respectfully submitted,

s/ Jared B. Caplan
Jared B. Caplan
Attorney of Record for Amici

OF COUNSEL:

Jared B. Caplan
Texas Bar No. 24031913
BRADLEY ARANT BOULT CUMMINGS LLP
600 Travis St., Suite 4800
Houston, Texas 77002
Telephone: (713) 576-0300
Facsimile: (713) 576-0301
jcaplan@bradley.com

J. Bradley Robertson
Candice L. Rucker
Rachel A. Conry
BRADLEY ARANT BOULT CUMMINGS LLP
One Federal Place
1819 Fifth Avenue North
Birmingham, Alabama 35203
Telephone: (205) 521-8000
Facsimile: (205) 521-8800
brobertson@bradley.com
crucker@bradley.com
rconry@bradley.com

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on January 30, 2019, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit by using the CM/ECF system, which effected service on all counsel of record.

s/ Jared B. Caplan
Jared B. Caplan
Attorney of Record for Amici

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

1. This document complies with the type-volume limits of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B) and Fed. R. App. P. 29 because, excluding the parts of the document exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(f), this document contains 6,309 words.

2. This document complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because this document has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word with Times New Roman 14-point font.

s/ Jared B. Caplan
Jared B. Caplan
Attorney of Record for Amici