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[Redacted]

Directors' Protective Staff  
Protective Operations Division

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12/20/2006 12:18 PM

[Redacted]

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To:

cc:

[Redacted]

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Subject: Pickup for dep from Andrews- 21 Dec DCIA trip

DPS will depart the DCIA garage at 0430 tomorrow morning for Andrews, suggest you arrive to the Directors suite o/a 0415 to go down the elevator to the pick point. Thanks and please confirm you will accompany the detail to Andrews or have any questions regarding the movement.

[Redacted] (b)(6)

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[Redacted]

12/20/2006 06:17 PM

To:

cc:

[Redacted]

(b)(3) CIAAct

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Subject: Re: FINAL FINAL DCIA Visit Schedule

[Redacted]

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

Original Text of

[Redacted]

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DO/CTC

[Redacted]

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12/20/2006 12:55 PM

To:

cc:

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Subject: FINAL FINAL DCIA Visit Schedule



Proposed itinerary for DCIA visit t to Guantanamo Bay.doc

[Redacted]

Pls forward to [Redacted] - final schedule- thanks

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### Proposed Itinerary for DCIA Visit to Guantanamo Bay 21 December 2006

Time	Event	Remarks
0845	VIP arrival	Move to Leeward pier via [redacted] vehicles and [redacted] vessel to Officer's landing
0915	Arr Officer's Landing	[redacted]
0930	Rolling tour of Camp Delta	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]	Walking tour
[redacted]	[redacted]	Lunch; tour of facility
[redacted]	[redacted]	Walking tour
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]	Enroute to NEX
1440	Arr NEX	Enroute to Officer's landing
1505	Arr Officer's Landing	Enroute to Leeward Pier
1525	Arr Leeward Pier	Enroute to tarmac
1530	VIP Departure	

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
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### Guantanamo Bay High-Value Detainee Detention Facility



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#### Current Detainees:

To date, CIA has sent fourteen high-value detainees to the high-value detention center at GTMO (Please see attachment A for their names and background information). Upon their arrival at site, all detainees are subject to the same general in-processing utilized by DoD for other detainees arriving at GTMO, including being provided a thorough medical exam by the on-site DoD physician, as well as any needed dental and psychiatric care. Per current detainee standards, each of the high value detainees is assigned a private room, basic amenities, and limited reading material. All detainees are offered daily solo recreation in a large outdoor area, as well as joint recreation time with another detainee, during which the two detainees can interact socially.

#### Criteria for Future Detainees:

In order for a detainee to be considered for transfer from the CIA program to GTMO, first the detainee must no longer be of significant intelligence value. Second, a determination must be made that the detainee would be subject to trial by military commission, as outlined by the Military Commission Act of 2006. Third, a policy decision must be made that the US Government desires to prosecute the individual in a U.S. military commission, vice transferring the detainee to a third country. Last, the Department of Defense must agree to the transfer of the detainee to GTMO.

#### End Game:

The CIA desires to maintain custody of any given detainee only so long as that detainee continues to provide significant intelligence. Once that has been accomplished

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CIA's end game is to ensure that the detainee, if deemed a continuing threat, is either [redacted]

[redacted] or transferred to GTMO to stand trial before a Military Commission. Once at GTMO, CIA's end game is to assist DoD in any way possible in the Military Commission process, while at the same time protecting CIA equities.

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### Guantanamo Bay High-Value Detainee Detention Facility:

~~(TS)~~ [redacted] ~~(NF)~~ [redacted]

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#### Detainees:

~~(TS)~~ [redacted] ~~(NF)~~ To date, CIA has sent fourteen high-value detainees to the high-value detention center at GTMO (Please see attachment A for their names and background information). Upon their arrival at site, all detainees are subject to the same general in-processing utilized by DoD for all detainees arriving at GTMO, including being provided a thorough medical exam by the on-site DoD physician, and any needed dental and psychiatric care. Per current detainee standards, each of the high value detainees is assigned a private cell, basic amenities, and limited reading material. All detainees are offered daily solo recreation in a large outdoor area, as well as joint recreation time with another detainee, during which the two detainees can interact socially but remain physically separated.

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#### Criteria for Future Detainees:

~~(TS)~~ [redacted] ~~(NF)~~ In order for a detainee to be considered for transfer from the CIA program to GTMO, first the detainee must no longer be of significant intelligence value. Second, a determination must be made that the detainee would be subject to trial by military commission, as outlined by the Military Commission Act of 2006. Third, a policy decision must be made that the US Government desires to prosecute the individual in a U.S. military commission, vice transferring the detainee to a third country. Last, the Department of Defense must agree to the transfer of the detainee to GTMO.

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#### End Game:

~~(TS)~~ [redacted] ~~(NF)~~ The CIA desires to maintain custody of any given detainee only so long as that detainee continues to provide significant intelligence. Once that has been accomplished [redacted]

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
MR

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(b)(1) at a CIA facility), the CIA's end game is to ensure that the detainee, if deemed a  
(b)(3) NatSecAct continuing threat, is either

or transferred to GTMO to stand trial before a Military Commission. Once at GTMO, CIA's end game is to assist DoD in any way possible in the Military Commission process, while at the same time protecting CIA equities.

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<b>NAME</b>	Zubair
<b>PHONETICS</b>	zoo-BEAR
<b>KEY ALIAS(ES)</b>	Mohd Farik bin Amin (true name), Zaid
<b>AFFILIATION(S)</b>	Jemaah Islamiya and al-Qa'ida
<b>NATIONALITY</b>	Malaysian
<b>DATE DETAINED</b>	8 June 2003

Al-Qa'ida and Jemaah Islamiya (JI) member Mohd Farik Bin Amin—best known as Zubair—served directly under JI operational planner Hambali. As one of Hambali's trusted associates, Zubair assisted in Hambali's operations, which included casing targets for JI planned attacks, until his capture in June 2003. Hambali in November 2001 tapped Zubair to be a suicide operative for an al-Qa'ida attack targeting Los Angeles. Zubair played a role in transferring funds used to finance terrorist attacks in Southeast Asia from al-Qa'ida operations chief Khalid Shaykh Muhammad to Hambali. Zubair received small arms and combat tactics training at al-Qa'ida's al-Faruq Camp in Afghanistan in 2000 and again in 2001. While earning his degree in electronics telecommunications in Malaysia, Zubair met fellow student Bashir Bin Lap (a.k.a. Lillie), who also later became one of Hambali's lieutenants and was captured with Hambali in 2003. (U)





<b>NAME</b>	Ramzi Bin al-Shibh
<b>PHONETICS</b>	Rahm-zee bihn-uhl-SHEEB
<b>KEY ALIASES</b>	Abu Ubaydah, 'Umar Muhammad 'Abdallah Ba' Amar
<b>AFFILIATION</b>	Al-Qa'ida
<b>NATIONALITY</b>	Yemeni
<b>DATE DETAINED</b>	11 September 2002

Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, a key facilitator for the attacks on 11 September 2001, was a lead operative—until his capture in Pakistan in 2002—in the post-11 September plot conceived of by 11 September mastermind Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) to hijack aircraft and crash them into Heathrow Airport in the United Kingdom. (U)


Bin al-Shibh was born in 1972 in southern Yemen. He noted that he was religious from the age of 12 and fought briefly in Yemen's civil war in 1994. After two attempts to immigrate to the United States failed, Bin al-Shibh traveled to Germany, where he applied for political asylum under an assumed name and as a Sudanese citizen. Denied his request for asylum in January 1996, he left Germany and returned to Yemen, where he applied for a visa in his true name. In December 1997, he returned to Germany, where he became a student. In Hamburg, he met hijackers Muhammad Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, and Ziad Jarrah. (U)

Bin al-Shibh, Atta, al-Shehhi, and Jarrah traveled to Afghanistan in 1999. In Afghanistan, the four men met Usama Bin Ladin, pledged their loyalty to him, and readily accepted Bin Ladin's proposal to martyr themselves in an operation against the United States. Bin al-Shibh was slated to be one of the 11 September hijacker pilots. He and Atta traveled to Karachi, where they met with KSM.

- After returning to Germany in early 2000, Bin al-Shibh obtained a new passport but was unable to obtain a US visa, despite four attempts. Bin al-Shibh said that in late 2000 he tried to convince a US citizen in San Diego via e-mail to marry him to gain entry into the United States, but Atta convinced him to abandon the idea. Bin al-Shibh also traveled to the United Kingdom to find a bride but changed his mind. (U)

During the eight months before the attacks, Bin al-Shibh was the primary communications intermediary between the hijackers in the United States and al-Qa'ida's leadership in Afghanistan and Pakistan. He relayed orders from al-Qa'ida senior operatives to Atta via e-mail or phone, and he met with Atta in Germany in January 2001 and in Spain in July 2001 for in-depth briefings from Atta on the progress of the plot. He also made travel plans to the United States for some of the 11 September terrorists and facilitated the transfer of money to the 11 September terrorists, including convicted terrorist Zacharias Moussaoui. After learning from Atta in late August 2001 of the date of the hijacking attacks, Bin al-Shibh passed the information to KSM.

- A week before the 11 September attacks, Bin al-Shibh left Germany and arrived in Afghanistan three or four days after the attacks. In late 2001, he fled Afghanistan after the collapse of the Taliban and began working with KSM in Karachi on follow-on plots against the West, particularly the Heathrow plot. He was tasked by KSM to recruit operatives in Saudi Arabia for an attack on Heathrow Airport, and, as of his capture, Bin al-Shibh had identified four operatives for the operation. (U)



**NAME** `Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri  
**PHONETICS** AHbd al-Rah-HEEM ah-NASH-er-REE  
**KEY ALIAS(ES)** Abd al-Rahim Husayn Muhammad `Abdu Nashir (true name), Mullah Bilal, Bilal  
**AFFILIATION(S)** Al-Qa`ida  
**NATIONALITY** Saudi National of Yemeni descent  
**DATE DETAINED** October 2002 (S//NF)


`Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri was al-Qa`ida's operations chief in the Arabian Peninsula until his capture in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in late October 2002. Trained in explosives, Nashiri honed his expertise in suicide attacks and maritime operations. He led cells in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, and he was the mastermind and local manager of the bombing in October 2000 of the USS Cole. The success of the USS Cole operation appeared to have jettisoned Nashiri into a role of greater responsibility. (U)

Born in Mecca on 5 January 1965, Nashiri ended his formal education after intermediate school and eventually followed in the footsteps of his uncles and cousins to become a jihadist. He participated in Ibn al-Khattab's Chechen and Tajik jihads and became a trainer at al-Qa`ida's Khaldan camp in Afghanistan in 1992. After returning from Tajikistan, Nashiri, accompanied by al-Qa`ida operative Khallad bin `Attash, first met Usama Bin Ladin in 1994. In 1997, Nashiri fought with the Taliban in Kabul and Jalalabad. The following year, Nashiri and his cousin, Jihad Muhammad Abu Ali, were implicated in a Bin Ladin-sponsored operation to smuggle Sagger missiles into Saudi Arabia for use against an unspecified US military target. Nashiri was the leader of the plot and a major player in the Saudi cell at that time. (U)

Nashiri was tasked by Bin Ladin in a private meeting in Afghanistan in 1998 to attack a US or Western oil tanker off the coast of Yemen. This original objective was subsequently modified by Bin Ladin in 1999 to target a US military ship in the Port of Aden. Nashiri's operatives' first attempt was unsuccessful when their boat laden with explosives sank in January 2000—they were probably targeting the USS The Sullivans. Upon Bin Ladin's instructions to try again, Nashiri's suicide operatives successfully attacked the USS Cole in October, although Nashiri was in Afghanistan. (U)

At the time of his arrest in the UAE, Nashiri was arranging funding for a plot to crash a small airplane into the bridge of a Western navy vessel in Port Rashid, UAE, an operation he had hoped to execute in November or December 2002. He also was orchestrating additional attacks, one targeting a US housing compound in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, which he had earmarked for mid-2003.

- Nashiri abandoned a plot in 2002 to attack warships in the Strait of Hormuz, but his operatives—on orders from Bin Ladin—in October 2002 rammed the French tanker MV Limburg off the coast of Yemen with a small boat.
- Nashiri was involved in plotting a car bomb attack against a Saudi military installation at Tabuk aimed at killing US military personnel, attacks on oil tankers in the Strait of Gibraltar and Western warships passing through the Port of Dubai, and attacks against land-based targets in Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Qatar. Nashiri was convicted and sentenced to death by a Yemeni court, in absentia, for his part in the USS Cole bombing. (U)



<b>NAME</b>	Majid Khan
<b>PHONETICS</b>	MAH-jid KAHN
<b>KEY ALIAS(ES)</b>	Yusif
<b>AFFILIATION(S)</b>	Al-Qa'ida
<b>NATIONALITY</b>	Pakistani
<b>DATE DETAINED</b>	March 2003


Before his March 2003 capture, Pakistani national Majid Khan was an al-Qa'ida operative with direct connections to the United States. In 1996, Khan moved to the United States with his family and settled in Baltimore, Maryland, but never obtained US citizenship. After graduating from high school in 1999, Khan became involved in a local Islamic organization and, in early 2002, returned to Pakistan. In Pakistan, Khan's uncle and cousin, who were al-Qa'ida operatives, introduced Khan to senior al-Qa'ida operational planner Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM), who selected Khan as an operative for a possible attack inside the United States. KSM selected Khan because of his excellent English and extensive knowledge of the United States.

- During his stay in the United States, Khan worked at his family's gas station and was, therefore, able to assist KSM with his research into the feasibility of a plan to blow up gas stations in the United States. In support of this plot, Khan attended a training course at which he learned how to construct explosive timing devices.
- KSM further tasked Khan to conduct research on poisoning US water reservoirs and considered Khan for an operation to assassinate Pakistani President Musharraf. In addition, Khan passed a test that KSM orchestrated which showed that Khan was committed to being a suicide operative.
- In the fall of 2002 Khan also delivered money to Zubair, an operative who worked directly for Jemaah Islamiya (JI) leader and al-Qa'ida's South Asia representative Hambali. The money was to support terrorist attacks against Western targets. (U)

Khan and detained al-Qa'ida operative and facilitator 'Ammar al-Baluchi discussed with Uzair Paracha's father, Saifullah, a plan to use the New York office of Saifullah's Karachi-based textile import/export business to smuggle explosives into the United States for use with various al-Qa'ida attacks. Khan also had links to al-Qa'ida operatives and facilitators, most notably, Aafia Siddique, a US-educated neuroscientist and al-Qa'ida facilitator, who assisted Majid with documents to hide his travel to Pakistan from US authorities to reenter the United States. (U)

In early 2003, Khan tapped Uzair Paracha, a US permanent resident alien he met in Pakistan through 'Ammar, to impersonate Khan in the United States to make it appear as if Khan had never left the United States and obtain immigration documents that would enable Khan to illegally reenter. Uzair Paracha was convicted and recently sentenced to 30 years imprisonment in the United States for material support to terrorism. (U)

Khan recommended to KSM that Iyman Faris, a naturalized US citizen, be tasked for an al-Qa'ida operation. In 2003, Faris was convicted and sentenced to 20 years imprisonment in the United States on two counts pertaining to material support to terrorism. In 2002, Faris researched, at KSM's request, suspension bridges in New York and looked into obtaining the tools that would be necessary to cut bridge suspension cables. Faris has admitted that he believed Khan tried to recruit him for al-Qa'ida. (U)




<b>NAME</b>	Lillie
<b>PHONETICS</b>	LIL-lee
<b>KEY ALIAS(ES)</b>	Mohammed Nazir Bin Lep (true name), Bashir Bin Lep
<b>AFFILIATION(S)</b>	Jemaah Islamiya and al-Qa'ida
<b>NATIONALITY</b>	Malaysian
<b>DATE DETAINED</b>	11 August 2003

Malaysian-born Mohammed Nazir Bin Lep (a.k.a. Bashir Bin Lap)—better known as Lillie—was one of Hambali’s key lieutenants and had considerable operational experience. Lillie facilitated the transfer of al-Qa’ida funds used for the Jakarta Marriott Hotel bombing in 2003 and knew of the Jemaah Islamiya’s (JI) targets and plans to launch attacks elsewhere in Southeast Asia. In mid-2002, he cased targets in Bangkok and Pattaya, Thailand, at Hambali’s direction. Lillie was particularly interested in the ideas of martyrdom and was slated to be a suicide operative for an al-Qa’ida “second wave” attack targeting the US West Coast. Lillie also had links to now-deceased JI bombmaker Dr. Azahari bin Husin and in 2002 received bombmaking tutorials from Azahari. Lillie spent time in Kandahar, Afghanistan, in 2000, where he trained at al-Qa’ida’s al-Faruq camp in weaponry. Lillie attended Polytechnic University Malaysia in the mid-1990s, where he earned a degree in architecture. (U)

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
<b>NAME</b>	Lillie
<b>PHONETICS</b>	LIL-lee
<b>KEY ALIAS(ES)</b>	Mohammed Nazir Bin Lep (true name), Bashir Bin Lep
<b>AFFILIATION(S)</b>	Jemaah Islamiya and al-Qa'ida
<b>NATIONALITY</b>	Malaysian
<b>DATE DETAINED</b>	11 August 2003

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<b>NAME</b>	Khalid Shaykh Muhammad
<b>PHONETICS</b>	HAH-lid SHAKE moo-HAH-mud
<b>KEY ALIAS</b>	Mukhtar
<b>AFFILIATION</b>	Al-Qa'ida
<b>NATIONALITY</b>	Baluchi born and raised in Kuwait
<b>DATE DETAINED</b>	1 March 2003


Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) is one of history's most infamous terrorists, and his capture in March 2003 robbed al-Qa'ida of one of its most capable senior operatives. He devoted most of his adult life to terrorist plotting, specifically against the United States, and was the driving force behind the attacks on 11 September 2001 as well as several subsequent plots against US and Western targets worldwide. (U)

After graduating from North Carolina A&T State University in 1986 with a degree in mechanical engineering, KSM traveled to Afghanistan to participate in the anti-Soviet jihad there. The successful bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993 by his nephew Ramzi Yousef along with his anger at the US Government's support of Israel were key influences in his decision to engage in terrorism against the United States. KSM joined Yousef in the Philippines in 1994 to plan the "Bojinka" plot—the simultaneous bombings of a dozen US-flagged commercial airliners over the Pacific. After the plot was disrupted and Yousef was caught in early 1995, KSM was indicted for his role in the plot and went into hiding. By 1999, he convinced Usama Bin Ladin to provide him with operatives and funding for a new airliner plot, which culminated in the attacks on 11 September two years later.

- KSM formally joined al-Qa'ida in October 2001, but from 2000 he headed al-Qa'ida's Media Committee and he helped build close operational ties between al-Qa'ida and the Jemaah Islamiya (JI) terrorist group plotting against US and Israeli targets in Southeast Asia. (U)

By late 2001, with the collapse of the Taliban regime and the dispersal of al-Qa'ida's leadership, the prestige associated with engineering the attacks on 11 September propelled KSM into the role of external operations chief for al-Qa'ida. After 11 September, KSM elevated the United Kingdom on his target list because of London's strong support for Washington's global war on terror.

- In addition to his plots against Britain, KSM launched several plots against the US Homeland, including a plot in late 2001 to have JI suicide operatives hijack a plane over the Pacific and crash it into a skyscraper on the US West Coast; a plan in early 2002 to send al-Qa'ida operative and US citizen Jose Padilla to set off bombs in apartment buildings in a US city; and a plot in early 2003 to employ a network of Pakistanis—including Iyman Faris and Majid Khan—to smuggle explosives into New York and to target gas stations, railroad tracks, and a bridge in New York. (U)



<b>NAME</b>	Mustafa Ahmad al-Hawsawi
<b>PHONETICS</b>	moo-STAH-fah ahl-hah-SOW-ee
<b>KEY ALIAS(ES)</b>	Hashim 'Abd al-Rahman, Zahir, Ayyub, Muhammad Adnan
<b>AFFILIATION(S)</b>	Al-Qa'ida
<b>NATIONALITY</b>	Saudi
<b>DATE DETAINED</b>	1 March 2003

Mustafa Ahmad al-Hawsawi was one of two key financial facilitators entrusted by 11 September mastermind Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) to manage the funding for the hijackings. As a trusted, respected financial facilitator known to the leadership, al-Hawsawi separately met with Usama Bin Ladin, his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri, and al-Qa'ida spokesman Sulayman Bu Ghayth soon after the attacks on 11 September and had contact with many of al-Qa'ida's most senior managers. (U)

Various reports suggest that al-Hawsawi had direct ties to several of the hijackers and to other operatives, including Ramzi Bin al-Shibh—who delivered some money from al-Hawsawi to the hijackers. In addition, al-Hawsawi and Bin al-Shibh served as a communications link between KSM and the hijackers. He shared a United Arab Emirates (UAE)-based financial account with one hijacker—an account that funded the hijackers' activities in the month before the attacks on 11 September. Four hijackers returned money directly to al-Hawsawi in the week before the attacks, which al-Hawsawi then redeemed in the UAE. Al-Hawsawi also wired thousands of dollars to Bin al-Shibh in the summer of 2001, which funded the activities of Zacarias Moussaoui, who was contacted by Bin al-Shibh during that period, per KSM's instructions. KSM also maintained his own financial links to al-Hawsawi. In 2001, KSM held a supplemental credit card linked to an al-Hawsawi account based in the UAE.


- Al-Hawsawi worked in the al-Qa'ida media center in Afghanistan from 2000—while it was under the direction of KSM—until he departed for the UAE in early 2001. (U)

After the attacks on 11 September, al-Hawsawi fled the UAE and traveled to Afghanistan and to Pakistan, where he hid until his capture in 2003. KSM reportedly had been providing a safehouse and other logistic support to guarantee al-Hawsawi's security after he arrived in Pakistan.

- Hawsawi facilitated other operatives' travel, including Muhammad al-Qahtani, who was denied entry into the United States in the summer of 2001.
- Hawsawi's close relationship with KSM and the latter's active participation in providing for his security following 11 September suggests Hawsawi was key to KSM's operational team. (U)

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<b>NAME</b>	Hambali
<b>PHONETICS</b>	HAM-bali
<b>KEY ALIAS(ES)</b>	Riduan bin Isomuddin (true name), Encep Nurjaman
<b>AFFILIATION(S)</b>	Jemaah Islamiya and al-Qa'ida
<b>NATIONALITY</b>	Born in Indonesia, ethnically Sundanese
<b>DATE DETAINED</b>	11 August 2003

Indonesian-born Riduan bin Isomuddin—best known among jihadists as Hambali—was an operational mastermind in the Southeast Asia-based Islamic extremist group Jemaah Islamiya (JI) and also served as the main interface between JI and al-Qa'ida from 2000 until his capture in mid-2003. Hambali helped plan the first Bali bombings in 2002 that killed more than 200 persons and facilitated al-Qa'ida financing for the Jakarta Marriott Hotel bombing the following year. In late 2002, he also directed his subordinate Zubair to case the British High Commission in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Hambali was previously involved in the attempted assassination of the Philippine Ambassador to Indonesia in August 2000 and the bombings on Christmas Eve that year of some 30 churches across the archipelago. Hambali had longstanding ties to now-detained al-Qa'ida external operations chief Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM). Before returning to Southeast Asia in December 2001, Hambali discussed operations with senior al-Qa'ida leaders regarding post-11 September attacks against US interests. (U)

Hambali in 1999 established a cell of young JI up-and-comers in Karachi, Pakistan—dubbed al-Ghuraba—which provided its members with advanced doctrinal and operational training, including at al-Qa'ida training camps in Afghanistan. Hambali tapped his younger brother, Rusman “Gun Gun” Gunawan, as deputy Ghuraba cell leader. (U)

Hambali was born on 4 April 1964 and named Encep Nurjaman in Cianjur, West Java, and is the eldest male of 11 children. His great-grandfather founded a local Islamic school, which Hambali attended during his early adolescence. Press accounts of Hambali's childhood reveal that he romanticized the United States and had ambitions to become an astronaut. Hambali was a devout Muslim youth who, at age 20, left Indonesia for Malaysia, ostensibly to seek work. While there, he met JI cofounders Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir—fellow Indonesians who had fled the Suharto regime for Malaysia—and through them was exposed to radical Islamic teachings. Hambali tried unsuccessfully to get a scholarship to an Islamic school in Malaysia, before traveling in the mid-1980s to Afghanistan, where he fought alongside many of al-Qa'ida's future leaders. During his three-year stint in Afghanistan, he forged strong ties to Usama Bin Ladin and KSM. After returning to Malaysia in the early 1990s, Hambali and JI spiritual leader Bashir further developed their relationship and became close friends. (U)





<b>NAME</b>	Gouled Hassan Dourad
<b>PHONETICS</b>	Goo-LED HAH-san Door-AHD
<b>KEY ALIAS(ES)</b>	Guleed Hassan Ahmad, Hanad
<b>AFFILIATION(S)</b>	al-Qa'ida, al-Ittihad al-Islami
<b>NATIONALITY</b>	Somali
<b>DATE DETAINED</b>	4 March 2004

Gouled Hassan Dourad was the head of a Mogadishu-based facilitation network of al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI) members that supported al-Qa'ida members in Somalia. As an AIAI soldier with no decisionmaking authorities, Gouled was tapped to be a member of a small, selective group of AIAI members who worked for the East African al-Qa'ida cell led by Abu Talha al-Sudani—Gouled's responsibilities included locating safehouses, assisting in the transfer of funds, and procuring weapons, explosives, and other supplies.

- Information available to the US Government suggests that Gouled carried out only one low-level operational mission for Abu Talha: during September–October 2003, he cased the US military base in Djibouti—Camp Lemonier—as part of Abu Talha's plot to conduct a suicide truck-bombing attack. He also was tasked by Abu Talha to purchase two rocket-propelled grenades, five AK-47 assault rifles and four 9mm pistols, which he delivered to Abu Talha in mid-2003.
- Gouled was aware of several terrorist plots under consideration by his AIAI cell, including shooting down an Ethiopian jetliner landing at an airport in Somalia in 2003 and kidnapping Western workers of nongovernmental organizations in Hargeysa, Somalia, in 2002 as a means to raise money for future AIAI operations. Following Gouled's arrest in Djibouti, AIAI terrorists on 19 March 2004 tried unsuccessfully to kidnap a German aid worker and murdered a Kenyan contract employee in Hargeysa. (U)

Gouled was born in Mogadishu in 1974; when the Somali civil war erupted in 1991, his parents sent him to Germany, where he lived in a refugee camp. He traveled to Sweden and gained asylum there in 1993. In 1994, he attempted travel to the United States but was turned back in Iceland because of his fraudulent passport. Gouled's parents emigrated to the United States and were living in Minnesota around the time of his capture.


- Gouled became religious while in Sweden; he attended a Somali mosque, whose imam arranged for Gouled and his friend, future AIAI bombmaker Qasim Mohamed, to train in Afghanistan before joining the Somali war effort. Gouled trained at Khaldan camp in weapons and explosives from January through October 1996 and at another camp in Khowst in assassination techniques for several months. By late 1996, he returned to Somalia. (U)

Gouled became a member of AIAI in 1997 out of a commitment to support the Somali war against Ethiopia and to win the Ogaden region of Ethiopia—near the border with Kenya—back for Somalia. He fought against the Ethiopians in Ogaden off and on from 1997 to 2002 and trained AIAI fighters. He allegedly became associated with al-Qa'ida because its members were in Somalia and his AIAI cell, under orders from senior AIAI leaders, was obligated to help al-Qa'ida.

- Gouled was introduced to Abu Talha al-Sudani—who he said came to Mogadishu to hide following the Mombasa attacks in November 2002—in early 2003 by his AIAI cell leader. Gouled was recruited to work for Abu Talha, in part, because he had trained in Afghanistan; spoke Arabic, English, some Swedish, and Somali; and had a high-school education. (U)

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JA332



**NAME** Zayn al-'Abidin Abu Zubaydah  
**PHONETIC** AH-Boo Zoo-BAY-duh  
**KEY ALIASES** Hani, Tariq  
**AFFILIATIONS** Al-Qa'ida  
**NATIONALITY** Palestinian, raised in Saudi Arabia  
**DATE DETAINED** 27 March 2002

Zayn al-'Abidin Abu Zubaydah was a leading, independent mujahidin facilitator who operated in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region from the mid-1990s. Although he never pledged bay'ah to Usama Bin Ladin, Abu Zubaydah functioned as a full member of al-Qa'ida and was a trusted associate of the organization's senior leaders. Despite Abu Zubaydah's freelance status, Bin Ladin recruited him to be one of al-Qa'ida's senior travel facilitators following Abu Zubaydah's success in 1996 at securing safe passage of al-Qa'ida members returning from Sudan to Afghanistan. In November 2001, Abu Zubaydah helped smuggle now-deceased al-Qa'ida in Iraq leader Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi and some 70 Arab fighters out of Kandahar, Afghanistan, into Iran.

- At the time of his capture, Abu Zubaydah was trying to organize a terrorist attack in Israel—a longtime goal of his that never got beyond the preliminary planning state—and had enlisted the help of fellow Palestinian Zarqawi in finding a smuggling route into Israel for moving persons and materials. Fighting Israel was allegedly Abu Zubaydah's sole aim when he initially joined the jihad, but he later considered conducting operations against the United States apparently because he viewed the US detention of Shaykh 'Umar 'Abd al-Rahman (a.k.a. the Blind Shaykh) as an affront to Islam.
- Although not directly linked to the attacks on 11 September 2001, the \$50,000 that Abu Zubaydah received from Saudi donors and passed to al-Qa'ida's senior leadership for his Israel plot may have been used for the attacks. Moreover, three of the hijackers received basic training at al-Qa'ida's Khaldan camp in Afghanistan, which was part of the "Khaldan group" of camps and guesthouses that he oversaw between 1995 and 2000. (U)

Abu Zubaydah's early work as a mujahidin facilitator in the mid-1990s focused on recruiting Arabs in Pakistan and arranging their travel for various training camps in Afghanistan and the frontlines of Bosnia and Chechnya. Between 1994 and early 2000, he often smuggled both persons and chemicals—such as cyanide and nitrates for use by al-Qa'ida in making weapons—from Pakistan into Afghanistan. He learned document forgery and trained in explosives at the Khaldan camp, where he advanced to become instructor and then administrative director. In his role as a senior mujahidin facilitator and Khaldan camp director, he assisted countless Western-based trained jihadists, including Americans—such as Adam Gadahn, to whom Abu Zubaydah served as a mentor.


- Abu Zubaydah established a document forgery network in Pakistan that supported al-Qa'ida and other extremist groups. In the late 1990s, he procured funds from donors in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, which he doled out to various contacts in Pakistan-based extremist networks for their terrorist activities.
- Abu Zubaydah also assisted US Millennium plot operative Ahmad Ressaym to enter Afghanistan to attend a training camp in the late 1990s and to travel to Canada via the United States at the end of 1998. He facilitated the travel and training of the Jordanian cell that was involved in Jordan's Millennium plot. (U)

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**JA335**



<b>NAME</b>	Abu Faraj al-Libi
<b>PHONETICS</b>	AH-boo FAH-raj ahl-LEE-bee
<b>KEY ALIAS(ES)</b>	Mustafa al-'Uzayti (probable true name), Mahfuz, 'Abd al-Hafiz, Abu Hamada, Tawfiq
<b>AFFILIATION(S)</b>	Al-Qa'ida
<b>NATIONALITY</b>	Libyan
<b>DATE DETAINED</b>	May 2005

Veteran paramilitary commander and facilitator in the Pakistan-Afghanistan theater, Abu Faraj took on more direct operational responsibilities following the arrest in March 2003 of former al-Qa'ida external operations chief and 11 September mastermind Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM). He was the organization's general manager subordinate only to Usama Bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri beginning in mid-2003, while being heavily involved in financing operatives and their families. (U)

Abu Faraj was the sole communications conduit for al-Qa'ida managers to Bin Ladin from August 2003 until his capture in May 2005. He was the recipient of couriered messages and public statements from Bin Ladin on approximately five occasions and passed messages to Bin Ladin from both senior lieutenants and rank-and-file members. Some of his work almost certainly required personal meetings with Bin Ladin or Zawahiri, a privilege reserved since 2002 for select members of the group. (U)

Abu Faraj had frequent contact with former senior operational planner Hamza Rabi'a, and other senior managers involved with al-Qa'ida's external operations and paramilitary efforts, and he most likely has extensive knowledge of their work, including efforts to attack the United States. Abu Faraj searched for operatives on Rabi'a's behalf, including those who could travel to the United States for attacks, and he also asked now-deceased al-Qa'ida in Iraq leader Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi to target US interests outside of Iraq.

- Pakistan wanted Abu Faraj for suspected involvement in plots to assassinate Pakistani President Musharraf.
- Abu Faraj served as chief of al-Qa'ida's training camps in Afghanistan in the 1990s. (U)

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**JA337**

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**JA338**

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**JA339**



# United States Navy **Biography**

## **Rear Admiral Harry B. Harris, Jr. Commander, Joint Task Force, Guantanamo**

Rear Admiral Harry B. Harris, Jr., was born in Yokosuka, Japan, and reared in Tenn. and Fla. He graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1978. After flight training, he was assigned to VP-44, homeported in Brunswick, Maine. His subsequent operational tours include assignment as a Tactical Action Officer onboard *USS Saratoga* (CV-60), when CV-60 participated in the *Achille Lauro* incident and strikes against Libya; Operations Officer in VP-4 during *Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm*; and three tours with Patrol and Reconnaissance Wing 1/CTF57/CTF 72, homeported in Kami Seya, Japan. In 2002, he reported to Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, serving as ACOS for Operations, Plans, and Pol-Mil Affairs (N3/N5) where he was responsible for the planning and execution of the Naval component's portion of *Operation Iraqi Freedom*.



His command assignments include VP-46 at Whidbey Island, Wash., and Patrol and Reconnaissance Wing 1/CTF57/CTF 72 at Kami Seya, Japan. While in command of Wing 1, Task Force 57 was heavily involved in *Operation Enduring Freedom*, flying nearly 1,000 combat sorties over Afghanistan.

Rear Adm. Harris' shore assignments include Aide and Flag Lieutenant to the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Japan, in Yokosuka, Japan; duty on the staff of

the Chief of Naval Operations as a strategist in the Strategy and Concepts Branch; and Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

His education assignments include selection for the Navy's Harvard/Tufts Program, where he graduated with a master's of Public Administration from Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government in 1992. Subsequently selected as an Arthur S. Moreau Scholar, he studied international relations and ethics of war at Oxford and Georgetown Universities, earning a master of Arts in National Security Studies from the latter in 1994. While at Georgetown, he was also Fellow in the School of Foreign Service.

In August 2004, in his first Flag assignment, he reported to the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations as Director, Information, Plans and Security Division, responsible for Navy current operations and anti-terrorism/force protection policy.

In March 2006, he assumed command of Joint Task Force Guantanamo in Cuba.

Rear Adm. Harris has logged 4400 flight hours, including over 400 combat hours, in U.S. and foreign maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft. His personal decorations include the Defense Superior Service Medal, the Legion of Merit (3 awards), the Bronze Star (2 awards), the Meritorious Service Medal (4 awards), the Air Medal, the Joint Service Commendation Medal, the Navy Commendation Medal (5 awards), the Navy Achievement Medal, and various campaign and unit decorations.

*Updated: 3 April 2006*

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

**Strawman Agenda** (b)(1)  
**D/CIA** (b)(3) NatSecAct  
**visit to GTMO 21 December 2006**

- 1. Wheels up 0530 local Andrews AFB
- 2. Wheels down 0845 local GTMO. (b)(1)  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Met planeside [redacted]

- 3. Transported to [redacted] (b)(1) vessel and moved to windward side of island  
(arrive - 0910). (b)(3) NatSecAct

- 4. Met dockside at windward side with [redacted] vehicles.

[Large redacted block]

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

- 14. Return to windward side dock (arrive 1525)
- 15. Depart windward side and arrive leeward side at 1530.

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(b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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[Redacted]

16. Arrive leeward side, move to aircraft, load and depart no later than 1545.

17. Arrive Andrews AFB at 1800.

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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