

AUG 31 2020

Sherri R. Carter, Executive Officer/Clerk of Court
By Sheryl R. Humber Deputy
Sheryl R. Humber

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**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
CLARA SHORTRIDGE FOLTZ CRIMINAL JUSTICE CENTER
CRIMINAL WRITS CENTER**

In re) **Case No.: BH012910**
SEARCH WARRANT TO GOOGLE FOR)
ALL RECORDS ASSOCIATED WITH) **ORDER RE: MOTION TO QUASH SEARCH**
GOOGLE ACCOUNT) **WARRANT**
SCOTTARCLA@GMAIL.COM

AFTER A HEARING

Motion to quash search warrant, return property, and destroy all seized information, filed by Petitioner Scott Budnick, represented by Alan J. Jackson, Esq.; Kelly C. Quinn, Esq.; and Mehrunisa Ranjha, Esq. Respondents, the County of Los Angeles and the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (LASD), represented by Raymond J. Fuentes, Esq., and John L. Fuentes, Esq. **Granted.**

BACKGROUND

Petitioner is a civilian who spends a significant amount of his time working as a juvenile justice advocate, which includes lobbying for legislative reform, advocating for educational programs in the juvenile justice system, and assisting minors charged with crimes. Petitioner is not an attorney. Petitioner became involved in the case of Abel Diaz, who was charged with the

1 murder of a police officer.¹ Through the Diaz case, Petitioner caught the attention of Sergeant
2 Richard Biddle, who had been investigating the case and had authored several prior warrants
3 related to the case.

4 On April 3, 2019, Judge Michael E. Pastor, acting as magistrate, signed a search warrant
5 for all records associated with the Google account scottarcla@gmail.com, which belongs to
6 Petitioner, from the date of inception, including all emails, financial records, location data,
7 search history, call records, voice messages, and multimedia messages. An order to delay
8 notification of the search warrant for 90 days was also signed on the same date.

9 The warrant incorporated several previously obtained search warrants by reference,
10 including a warrant obtained for the search of the scottarc@gmail.com Google account. (Search
11 Warrant (Warrant), dated Apr. 3, 2019, attached to mtn. as exh. A, at p. 10.) The warrant was
12 obtained as part of an investigation into alleged criminal activities including conspiracy to
13 obstruct justice (Pen. Code, § 182, subd. (a)(5)),² conspiring to offer false evidence in judicial
14 proceedings (§ 132), conspiring to destroy/conceal evidence (§ 135), conspiring to intimidate
15 witnesses (§ 136), conspiring to induce false testimony (§ 137), conspiring to violate court orders
16 (§ 166.4), conspiring to illegally communicate or contact a prisoner (§ 4570), and conspiring to
17 tamper with records or documents in possession of a government agency (Gov. Code, § 6200).
18 (*Ibid.*)
19

20 On February 19, 2020, Petitioner filed a motion to quash the search warrant, return
21 property, and destroy all seized information. Petitioner contends that the warrant was not
22 supported by probable cause, that the warrant was based on prior warrants that were also illegal,
23 and that the warrant violated the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act (CalECPA),
24 sections 1546 to 1546.4, in its breadth and scope. On March 16, 2020, the court signed and filed
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27 ¹ Diaz's case was ultimately adjudicated in the Juvenile Division of this court, where he
28 was found to be responsible for the death of a police officer.

² All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

1 a protective order preventing Respondent from accessing, viewing, copying, manipulating,
2 disseminating, or interacting in any way with the property seized pursuant to the search warrant.
3 On March 16, 2020, the American Civil Liberties Union and the American Civil Liberties Union
4 of Northern and Southern California filed a brief in support of the motion to quash as amici
5 curiae, which the court allowed. On March 25, 2020, Respondent filed an ex parte application
6 for an order to vacate the protective order. On March 26, 2020, Petitioner filed an opposition to
7 Respondent's ex parte application. The court declined to sign a proposed order included with the
8 ex parte application, noting that it was not an ex parte matter. On April 14, 2020, Respondent
9 filed an opposition to the motion to quash. On July 2, 2020, Petitioner filed a reply to
10 Respondent's opposition to the motion to quash. On July 7, 2020, the court conducted a hearing
11 on the motion, and took the matter under submission.
12

13 SUMMARY OF WARRANT³

14 As discussed *ante*, the April 3, 2019 warrant that is the subject of the instant motion
15 sought all records associated with the Google account scottarcla@gmail.com from the date of
16 inception, including all emails, financial records, location data, search history, call records, voice
17 messages, and multimedia messages. (Warrant at pp. 2–3.) The justification for the 90-day
18 delay in notification of the warrant was the belief that notification of the warrant's existence
19 would cause destruction of or tampering with the evidence to occur. (*Id.* at p. 6.) The warrant
20 was obtained as part of an ongoing investigation into alleged criminal activities including
21 conspiracy to obstruct justice (§ 182, subd. (a)(5)), conspiring to offer false evidence in judicial
22 proceedings (§ 132), conspiring to destroy/conceal evidence (§ 135), conspiring to intimidate
23 witnesses (§ 136), conspiring to induce false testimony (§ 137), conspiring to violate court orders
24 (§ 166.4), conspiring to illegally communicate or contact a prisoner (§ 4570), and conspiring to
25 tamper with records or documents in possession of a government agency (Gov. Code, § 6200).
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27 ³ The instant warrant consists of hundreds of pages, which both parties are familiar with.
28 Therefore, the following summary contains only a general description of the contents of the
warrant and its numerous attachments.

1 (*Id.* at p. 10.) Attached and incorporated in the instant warrant was a previous search warrant,
2 which itself incorporated another previous warrant, which then incorporated other previous
3 warrants, and so forth, in a situation not dissimilar to a set of nesting dolls. (Hearing Transcript
4 (“HT”), dated Jul. 7, 2020, at p. 4.)

5 Sergeant Biddle related his extensive training and experience investigating criminal
6 activity, specifically regarding assaults, robberies, burglaries, narcotics, gang behavior, fraud,
7 identity theft, and homicide. (Warrant at p. 8.) Sergeant Biddle stated that he has received
8 training regarding cellular phones as related to criminal investigations, and is of the opinion that
9 “regardless of the crime, it is likely the suspect used a cell phone before, during, or after the
10 commission of the crime.” (*Id.* at pp. 8–9.) Sergeant Biddle asserted that he has become
11 familiar with social media websites and that people occasionally post incriminating photographs
12 or writings on social media accounts, which can prove useful in prosecuting criminal cases. (*Id.*
13 at p. 10.)

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15 Sergeant Biddle stated his belief that Petitioner’s Google account would contain
16 communications between Petitioner and members of the Office of the District Attorney, the
17 LASD, and the Los Angeles County Probation Department (Probation Department)
18 “documenting inappropriate and potential criminal acts regarding [Petitioner’s] involvement in
19 obstructing justice and other criminal conduct” (Warrant at p. 11.) He also stated his belief
20 that the account would contain evidence of an “ongoing conspiracy to alter, remove, falsify, or
21 conceal records and or documents in possession of government agencies” and would identify co-
22 conspirators of Petitioner’s. (*Ibid.*) Additionally, Sergeant Biddle stated that the account would
23 contain communications regarding Petitioner “inappropriately providing legal advice to adult and
24 juvenile criminal defendants.” (*Ibid.*) Sergeant Biddle attached and incorporated a February 27,
25 2019 search warrant for the scottarc@gmail.com email address, which he apparently mistakenly
26 believed was Petitioner’s email address. (*Id.* at p. 10.)
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1 The attached February 27, 2019 warrant included a transcript of a jail call between
2 Petitioner and Diaz from July 2015 in which Petitioner discussed Diaz's pending criminal case
3 and the process for hiring a new lawyer for Diaz, as well as a transcript of a call from December
4 2015 in which Petitioner again discussed Diaz's pending criminal case. (Warrant at pp. 21–33.)
5 Sergeant Biddle alleged that these transcripts provided evidence of Petitioner's "involvement in
6 criminal proceedings and his on-going conspiracies to obstruction of justice." (*Id.* at p. 33.) He
7 alleged that the calls documented Petitioner stating that he communicated with people in the
8 District Attorney's Office regarding Diaz's case and showed that Petitioner provided
9 "inappropriate legal advice" to Diaz without Diaz's attorney's knowledge or permission. (*Ibid.*)

10 Attached to the February 27, 2019 warrant was another warrant, this warrant being for the
11 search of Probation Department email accounts for any emails about Petitioner, Diaz's attorney
12 Michael Cavalluzzi, or search warrants. (Warrant at p. 39.) The warrant alleged that the
13 requested emails contained evidence regarding "conspiracy to obstruct justice, conspiracy to
14 provide false evidence in judicial proceedings, witness dissuading, conspiracy to facilitate illegal
15 communications with in custody defendants, and conspiracy to conceal evidence related to a
16 criminal investigation." (*Ibid.*) A similar warrant was attached regarding LASD emails. (*Id.* at
17 pp. 42–44.) Attached to these warrants were anonymous letters alleging inappropriate conduct
18 between Petitioner and the Probation Department; search warrants dated August 2, 2017, and
19 April 14, 2017, for Probation Department records related to Petitioner's contact with Diaz;
20 reports regarding Diaz's participation in juvenile programming; reports regarding alleged
21 violations of Probation Department policies by Petitioner; reports containing allegations of
22 misconduct and inappropriate physical contact with juveniles by Petitioner; and reports regarding
23 the Probation Department's failure to comply with search warrants for information regarding
24 Petitioner. (*Id.* at p. 46.) Additionally, a search warrant for the homes of family members of
25 Diaz was attached, as well as reports and evidence associated with that search warrant. (*Id.* at p.
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1 47.) Lastly, a report regarding the arrest and interview of Jose Alvarado, Diaz's brother, was
2 attached. (*Ibid.*)

3 Sergeant Biddle alleged in the warrant for emails from the Probation Department that
4 Petitioner and Diaz's attorneys advocated for Diaz to remain in Juvenile Hall pending transfer to
5 the Department of Juvenile Justice, after Diaz entered into a plea agreement. (Warrant at p. 48.)
6 Sergeant Biddle alleged that Diaz would sign into classes at Juvenile Hall and then return to his
7 dorm without attending the classes. (*Id.* at p. 47.) Sergeant Biddle alleged that Petitioner called
8 jail inmates and discussed disciplinary proceedings with them, as well as support letters and
9 recommendation letters authored by Petitioner. (*Id.* at pp. 49–50.) Sergeant Biddle also stated
10 that Petitioner previously received a reprimand from the LASD for violating jail policies and that
11 at one point in 2019, Petitioner's volunteer status was revoked by the LASD. (*Id.* at p. 50.)

12 The attached anonymous letter from the Probation Department expressed concern over
13 possible policy violations perpetrated by Petitioner during his meetings with Diaz and his
14 discussions with Diaz about the criminal case. (Warrant at p. 55.) An attached Probation
15 Department special incident report described an incident wherein Petitioner was granted access
16 to the Probation Department because he "had the Probation Chief on speed dial." (*Id.* at p. 56.)
17 The report also described Petitioner's cell phone use in the facility. (*Id.* at p. 57.) An attached
18 2017 LASD complaint report co-authored by Sergeant Biddle discussed various recorded jail
19 phone calls with Petitioner where he discussed details of pending criminal cases with juveniles,
20 including in some instances advising them to fire their current attorneys, as well as instances of
21 Probation Department policy violations. (*Id.* at pp. 59–71.)

22 A 2017 warrant for the search of Probation Department and Juvenile Hall records for any
23 files or records related to Diaz was attached, including for mental health records and entries in
24 the Juvenile Hall Log Book for Petitioner and any known associates. (Warrant at pp. 72–94.)
25 The affidavit attached to the warrant also contained a summary of jail calls between Petitioner
26 and inmates, including Diaz, where Petitioner discussed details of pending criminal cases. (*Id.* at
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1 pp. 81–87.) A subpoena duces tecum for Probation Department records was attached. (*Id.* at pp.
2 95–105.) Many documents previously mentioned were duplicated as what appear to be
3 attachments to the 2017 warrant discussed *ante*. Additional jail call summaries were included.
4 (*Id.* at pp. 123–144, 151–159.) A summary of Diaz’s probation records was also attached,
5 including mental health records and disciplinary records. (*Id.* at pp. 145–150, 160–165.)

6 A summary of a conversation Sergeant Biddle had with Scott Sanders of the Probation
7 Department in 2017 was attached, in which Sanders described alleged policy violations by
8 Petitioner, as well as the process of producing Diaz’s records. (Warrant at pp. 166–171.) A
9 summary of a 2018 meeting between Sergeant Biddle, two prosecutors, Probation Department
10 staff, and several other law enforcement officers was attached, in which Petitioner’s relationship
11 with juveniles was described. (*Id.* at pp. 172–175.) A summary of the search warrant service on
12 the Probation Department was also included. (*Id.* at pp. 177–178.)

13 A 2018 search warrant for Diaz’s living space at Juvenile Hall; Maricela Alvarado’s
14 (Diaz’s sister) home, person, and cell phone; Jose Alvarado’s home, person, and cell phone; and
15 Miguel Garcia’s person and cell phone was included. (Warrant at pp. 182–207.) That warrant
16 sought evidence of 18 Street Gang criminal activity. (*Ibid.*) A report of an interview with
17 Garcia regarding his gang activity and relationship with Diaz was included. (*Id.* at pp. 208–212.)
18 A report of an interview with Adrian Nava, the husband of Maricela Alvarado, regarding his
19 connection to the 18 Street Gang, threats received by Maricela Alvarado, and his connection to
20 Diaz and Petitioner was also included. (*Id.* at pp. 213–218.) Additional reports regarding Nava
21 were also included, which included discussion of Petitioner and Diaz’s attorneys’ activities in
22 relation to Diaz’s case. (*Id.* at pp. 219–234.)

23 A 2018 report of the results of the search warrant served on Maricela Alvarado was
24 attached. (Warrant at pp. 235–240.) A 2018 report of the results of the search of Garcia’s and
25 Maricela Alvarado’s cell phones was also attached, including a description of a photo of
26 Petitioner with Diaz’s family. (*Id.* at pp. 241–246.) Additionally, a 2018 report of the arrest and
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1 interview of Jose Alvarado, including some discussion of things Petitioner did to assist Diaz with
2 his case, was attached. (*Id.* at pp. 247–252.) Another attached 2018 report included details of
3 jail calls made by Alvarado, including conversations with Diaz’s attorney; notes about
4 Petitioner’s meetings with Diaz, allegedly without the consent of Diaz’s attorney; notes about
5 Diaz’s attorneys’ conduct; and descriptions and transcripts of recorded Juvenile Hall calls. (*Id.*
6 at pp. 253–321.)

7 APPLICABLE LAW

8 The United States and California constitutions require a finding of probable cause before
9 a search warrant may be issued. (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. 1, § 13.) This
10 requirement is codified in section 1525, which states that “[a] search warrant cannot be issued
11 but upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, naming or describing the person to be searched
12 or searched for, and particularly describing the property, thing, or things and the place to be
13 searched.”
14 searched.”

15 “[P]robable cause is a flexible, common-sense standard.” (*Texas v. Brown* (1983) 460
16 U.S. 730, 742.) “A ‘practical, nontechnical’ probability that incriminating evidence is involved
17 is all that is required.” (*Ibid.*, quoting *Brinegar v. United States* (1949) 338 U.S. 160, 176.)
18 “This is not to say that probable cause can be made out by affidavits which are purely
19 conclusory, stating only the affiant’s . . . belief that probable cause exists without detailing any of
20 the ‘underlying circumstances’ upon which that belief is based.” (*U.S. v. Ventresca* (1965) 380
21 U.S. 102, 108.)

22 The test for probable cause is based on the totality of the circumstances, which allows
23 deficiencies in one area to be compensated for by strengths in another, and ultimately tasks the
24 issuing magistrate with making “a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the
25 circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him . . . there is a fair probability that contraband
26 or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” (*Illinois v. Gates* (1983) 462 U.S.
27 213, 233, 238.) “Sufficient information must be presented to the magistrate to allow that official
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1 to determine probable cause; his action cannot be a mere ratification of the bare conclusions of
2 others. In order to ensure that such an abdication of the magistrate’s duty does not occur, courts
3 must continue to conscientiously review the sufficiency of affidavits on which warrants are
4 issued.” (*Id.* at p. 239.) The totality of the circumstances test has been adopted by California
5 courts. (*People v. Brueckner* (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1500, 1504.)

6 In 2014, the United States Supreme Court held that a search warrant is required to search
7 the contents of a cell phone, noting that cell phones contain “detailed information about all
8 aspects of a person’s life.” (*Riley v. California* (2014) 573 U.S. 373, 396, 403 (“*Riley*”).)
9 CalECPA was enacted in California after the holding in *Riley*. Pursuant to CalECPA, a warrant
10 seeking access to electronic communication information must “describe with particularity the
11 information to be seized by specifying, as appropriate and reasonable, the time periods covered,
12 the target individuals or accounts, the applications or services covered, and the types of
13 information sought” (§ 1546.1, subd. (d)(1).)

14 CalECPA also includes a notice requirement. Section 1546.2, subdivision (a)(1), states
15 that the target of the warrant must be provided notice contemporaneously with execution of the
16 warrant, stating with reasonable specificity the nature of the investigation. “The notice shall
17 include a copy of the warrant or a written statement setting forth facts giving rise to the
18 emergency.” (§ 1546.2, subd. (a)(1).) If the court finds reason to believe that notification may
19 trigger an adverse result, the court may order delayed notification, not to exceed 90 days. (§
20 1546.2, subd. (b)(1).) An “adverse result” is defined as either danger to the life or physical
21 safety of an individual, flight from prosecution, destruction or tampering with evidence,
22 intimidation of potential witnesses, serious jeopardy to an investigation, or undue delay of a trial.
23 (§ 1546, subd. (a).)

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1 DISCUSSION

2 Proper Respondent

3 Petitioner briefly argues that there is no respondent in the instant case, and that counsel
4 for the County of Los Angeles and LASD should not have been permitted to appear on the
5 motion and defend the warrant. The court acknowledges the unique nature of the instant
6 proceeding, but allows counsel for the County of Los Angeles and LASD to appear as
7 Respondent due to the apparent absence of any other suitable respondent in this case. The court
8 is cognizant, however, that its review of the warrant is limited to the four corners of the
9 document, and renders its ruling with that principle in mind. (*People v. Frank* (1985) 38 Cal.3d
10 711, 729.)

11 CalECPA

12 As discussed *ante*, CalECPA details specific requirements for a warrant seeking access to
13 electronic communication information. These requirements appear to have been completely
14 disregarded in the instant case. As discussed *ante*, a warrant for electronic communication
15 information must state with particularity the information to be seized, the time period to be
16 covered, the applications and services covered, and the information sought. (§ 1546.1, subd.
17 (d)(1).) The instant warrant made no attempt to limit the amount of information to be searched.
18 General warrants permitting unlimited searches have “long been condemned,” even before the
19 advent of smart phones and the passage of CalECPA. (*Aday v. Superior Court* (1961) 55 Cal.2d
20 789, 796.) In the digital age, particularity and specificity in search warrants are more important
21 than ever.
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23 The warrant sought all information associated with the account from the date of
24 inception. It is not an overstatement to describe this warrant as seeking access to Petitioner’s
25 entire electronic existence, which likely contains details about his entire life, including
26 everywhere he has been, everyone he has communicated with, every financial transaction he has
27 made, and every piece of information he has searched for since he created the account. As
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1 seemingly no attempt was made to limit the scope of the search, it is impossible to conclude that
2 the warrant complied with the particularity requirements of CalECPA. Even if the warrant was
3 supported by probable cause, discussed *post*, the court would still be required to invalidate the
4 warrant as it does not meet the particularity requirements of CalECPA.

5 Petitioner also contends that the warrant did not comply with the notice requirement of
6 CalECPA. The court notes that the magistrate did find that notification of the existence of the
7 warrant would have had an adverse result, and signed an order to delay notification of the search
8 warrant as required by section 1546.2, subdivision (b)(1). On its face, the warrant appears to
9 have complied with CalECPA's notice requirement. Nevertheless, as discussed *ante*, the warrant
10 failed to meet the requirements of section 1546.1, subdivision (d)(1).

11 Probable Cause

12 The instant warrant, although lengthy, failed to establish probable cause. The court notes
13 that broad generalizations, even when based on law enforcement experience regarding the habits
14 of criminals, do not establish probable cause. (*People v. Pressey* (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1178,
15 1185.) A finding of probable cause cannot be made from an affidavit that is purely conclusory.
16 (*U.S. v. Ventresca, supra*, 380 U.S. at p. 108.) An affidavit must contain detailed circumstances
17 with reasons why the source of the information is credible. (*Id.* at pp. 108–109.)

18 When the gloss of advocacy is stripped away, the instant warrant simply did not establish
19 probable cause for the overwhelmingly invasive search requested. The warrant was painfully
20 short on actual facts, instead composed of conclusory allegations and speculation by Sergeant
21 Biddle. The warrant was extremely lengthy and difficult to navigate, consisting of multiple
22 interconnected and self-referential documents, including several previous search warrants. Much
23 of the information contained was duplicative. No facts were presented supporting allegations of
24 actual illegal conduct by Petitioner, much less the broad conspiracies penetrating multiple
25 government agencies alleged in the instant warrant. While certain conduct was alleged to be
26 inappropriate, or to constitute a policy violation, neither inappropriate conduct nor policy
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1 violations provide probable cause for an overbroad and intrusive search warrant such as the one
2 in the instant case.

3 Conduct such as providing legal advice to Diaz or contacting officials in the District
4 Attorney's Office or the Probation Department regarding the case does not constitute a crime.
5 Petitioner is not an attorney and is not bound by the ethical rules governing the profession, but
6 even if he was, the actions described in the instant warrant would hardly constitute criminal
7 activity. The warrant quite simply did not contain allegations of criminal activity supported by
8 any concrete facts. The warrant certainly did not contain allegations sufficient to justify access
9 to Petitioner's entire electronic existence.

10 The court finds that, considering the totality of the circumstances, the warrant challenged
11 in the instant motion was not supported by probable cause. As the court finds that the instant
12 warrant was not supported by probable cause, the court does not reach Petitioner's arguments
13 regarding the legality of the previous warrants referenced in the instant warrant and any allegedly
14 tainted evidence obtained pursuant to those warrants.

15
16 Remedy

17 Respondent suggests in the opposition to the motion to quash that if the court were to find
18 portions of the warrant invalid, the court should then invalidate and sever those portions of the
19 warrant without invalidating the warrant in its entirety. Petitioner alleges that this is not an
20 appropriate remedy pursuant to CalECPA, and argues that the only appropriate remedy is to
21 completely quash the warrant.

22 Section 1546.4, subdivision (a), states that any person "may move to suppress any
23 electronic information obtained or retained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United
24 States Constitution or of [CalECPA]." Section 1546.4, subdivision (c), states that an individual
25 targeted by a warrant "may petition the issuing court to void or modify the warrant" While
26 it appears that the court does have the discretion to modify the warrant pursuant to section
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1 1546.4, subdivision (c), the court agrees with Petitioner that the proper remedy in this case is to
2 quash the search warrant, return all seized property, and destroy all seized information.

3 As discussed *ante*, the warrant was lacking in probable cause and failed to comply with
4 any of CalECPA's particularity requirements. It does not appear to the court that some portions
5 of the warrant may be valid, when the warrant as a whole was in violation of CalECPA. As
6 Respondent made no attempt to sufficiently tailor the warrant initially, the court will not now
7 attempt to undertake the onerous task of sifting through the voluminous documents in order to
8 recover salvageable portions of the warrant, assuming for the sake of argument that any exist.

9
10 DISPOSITION

11 For all of the foregoing reasons, the motion to quash the April 3, 2019 search warrant,
12 return property, and destroy all seized information is GRANTED. The Los Angeles County
13 Sheriff's Department is ORDERED TO RETURN within 10 calendar days of the service of this
14 order all property seized pursuant to the warrant and destroy all information in its possession
15 obtained pursuant to the warrant. Within 30 days of service of this order the Los Angeles County
16 Sheriff's Department is to file and serve a return with this court, under penalty of perjury, as
17 evidence that it has fully complied with this order.

18 The Clerk is ordered to serve a copy of this order upon Alan J. Jackson, Esq.; Kelly C.
19 Quinn, Esq.; and Mehrunisa Ranjha, Esq., as counsel for Petitioner, and upon Raymond J.
20 Fuentes, Esq., and John L. Fuentes, Esq., as counsel for Respondents, the County of Los Angeles
21 and the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department.

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24 Dated: 8-31-20



25 
26 WILLIAM C. RYAN
27 Judge of the Superior Court
28

1 **Send a copy of this order to:**

2 Alan J. Jackson, Esq.
3 Kelly C. Quinn, Esq.
4 Mehrunisa Ranjha, Esq.
5 WERKSMAN JACKSON & QUINN LLP
6 888 West Sixth Street, Fourth Floor
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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES	Reserved for Clerk's File Stamp
COURTHOUSE ADDRESS: Clara Shortridge Foltz Criminal Justice Center 210 West Temple Street Los Angeles, CA 90012	FILED Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles
PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER In re: SEARCH WARRANT TO GOOGLE FOR ALL RECORDS ASSOCIATED WITH GOOGLE ACCOUNT SCOTTARCLA@GMAIL.COM	AUG 31 2020 Sherri R. Carter, Executive Officer/Clerk of Court By <u>Sheryl R. Humber</u> Deputy Sheryl R. Humber
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING CCP, § 1013(a) Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2(a)(1)	CASE NUMBER: BH012910

I, the below-named Executive Officer/Clerk of the above-entitled court, do hereby certify that I am not a party to the cause herein, and that this date I served:

- | | |
|--|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Order Extending Time | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Order re: Motion to Quash Search Warrant |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Order to Show Cause | <input type="checkbox"/> Order re: Eligibility |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Order for Informal Response | <input type="checkbox"/> Order re: Appointment of Counsel |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Order for Supplemental Pleading | <input type="checkbox"/> Copy of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus /Suitability
Hearing Transcript for the Attorney General |

I certify that the following is true and correct: I am the clerk of the above-named court and not a party to the cause. I served this document by placing true copies in envelopes addressed as shown below and then by sealing and placing them for collection; stamping or metering with first-class, prepaid postage; and mailing on the date stated below, in the United States mail at Los Angeles County, California, following standard court practices.

8/31/20
DATED AND DEPOSITED

SHERRI R. CARTER, Executive Officer/Clerk

By: S. HUMBER, CLERK

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