EXHIBIT 3 FILED UNDER SEAL ---

-CONFIDENTIAL Page 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE ----X ABDIQAFAR WAGAFE, et al., on : behalf of themselves and : others similarly situated, : Plaintiffs, -vs-: No. DONALD TRUMP, President of the: 17-cv-00094 RAJ United States, et al., : Defendants. CONFIDENTIAL UNDER THE PROTECTIVE ORDER 30(B)(6) VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF USCIS BY AND THROUGH KEVIN QUINN Thursday, September 3, 2020 10:09 a.m.

Job No.: 623013

Pages 1 - 312

Reported by: Tammy S. Newton

Page 31 1 BY MS. PASQUARELLA: 2 So do you know why the agency decided 3 that it was important to launch the CARRP policy? We wanted to ensure that we had a Α 5 consistent approach for identifying potential national security concerns for reviewing those 6 cases, for documenting and working those cases 7 and for getting those cases to and through 8 9 adjudication. 10 And was there something inconsistent about the way national security cases were 11 12 handled prior to CARRP? 13 MR. KIPNIS: Objection; scope. 14 can answer in your personal capacity. 15 THE WITNESS: Prior to CARRP, those 16 cases were, as I said, handled at headquarters, and part of CARRP was returning responsibility of 17 18 those cases back to the field offices. 19 BY MS. PASQUARELLA: 20 And why did they want to do that? Q MR. KIPNIS: Objection. Go ahead and 21 22 answer.

Page 32 1 THE WITNESS: Because the -- part of 2 the reason was that the local offices would have 3 greater familiarity with the A file, with the case, possibly with the case agents and cases of 5 law enforcement activity, and that coordination of the cases and, again, ultimately working with 6 7 adjudications would be facilitated by having the vetting of the cases done in the local office. 8 9 BY MS. PASQUARELLA: 10 Okay. And who was involved in the formulation of the CARRP policy? 11 12 Within USCIS, it was led -- it was 13 FDNS, Fraud Detection and National Security 14 division, as part of our national security and recordation directorate at the time, as well as 15 16 domestic operations, which oversaw the field offices and service centers, and the refugee 17 18 asylum international operations directorate, as 19 well as our Office of Chief Counsel. 20 Did anyone outside of USCIS Q participate in the formulation of CARRP? 21 22 Α No.

Page 35 1 question? What information did the agency 3 consider when it came up with its definition of national security concern that's contained in the 5 2008 CARRP policy? We reviewed the Immigration and 6 7 Nationality Act for the grounds of inadmissibility and removability to be included. 8 9 The cases involving national security concerns 10 were being worked at headquarters at the time. So the experience gained from working on those 11 cases informed the development of CARRP policy. 12 13 Okay. So the INA and your own 14 on-the-job experience. Was there anything else 15 that was considered? 16 Α No. And in the CARRP -- the 2008 CARRP 17 18 policy defines national security concerns to 19 include known or suspected terrorists, correct? 2.0 Α This is correct. 21 We'll refer to that as KST, a known or 22 suspected terrorist.

	Page 36
1	Are you aware of any other information
2	that the agency considered in deciding to treat
3	KSTs as national security concerns?
4	A Besides what we discussed?
5	Q Correct.
6	A No.
7	Q Okay. And did USCIS consider
8	information about the accuracy of the KST
9	designation in deciding to include KSTs as
10	national security concerns in the CARRP policy?
11	A What do you mean by "the accuracy"?
12	Q Any information about whether or not
13	the KST designation is accurate.
14	A Besides our experience working on
15	cases involving such individuals, no.
16	Q And when you say "experience", you
17	mean your on-the-job experience, correct?
18	A Yes.
19	Q Did it consider at the time the
20	evidentiary standard that's used by the
21	intelligence community in making the
22	determination that somebody is a KST?

Page 60 1 and security checks. 2 Additionally, there is a small section in the NaBISCOP that describes at a high level 3 some parts of the CARRP policy for those officers 4 5 who are running background and security checks but may not be otherwise familiar with the CARRP 6 7 policy. 8 Who would those people be who are 9 running the background checks that are not 10 otherwise familiar with the CARRP policy? It might be Immigration Services 11 Α 12 officers who are doing the upfront background and 13 security checks or who are otherwise running 14 background checks on cases prior to adjudication. 15 Okay. And when an adjustment of 16 status or a naturalization application is first filed, at what point are the background checks 17 18 initially run? 19 A number of the background checks are initiated fairly early in the process. The TECS 20 checks are typically done -- TECS is one of our 21 22 background and security checks and is required in

Page 61 1 all adjustment and naturalization cases. That 2 3 receipt of the application. 4 The FBI Name Checks are typically 5 implemented sometime shortly after that. A FBI fingerprint check is typically also required for 6 7 those applications, and that would be initiated sometime after we were able to capture the 8 9 applicant's biometrics so those can be submitted. 10 So those are the background checks that are run very early on. Are there other 11 12 background checks that are run at a later point? 13 Α There are other systems that officers may review as part of their adjudication, but 14 those are the mandatory background checks that 15 16 are run on all cases. I see. So the TECS FBI Name Check and 17 18 FBI fingerprint are the mandatory background 19 checks that are run in every case? 20 Actually, I apologize. I will add Α that our officers also review, as part of the 21 22 reviewing the information from the FBI

	Page 62
1	fingerprint check, information from the DHS
2	database IDENT, which houses biometric typically
3	entry information, as well as other biometric
4	encounters. So that's part of the biometrics
5	collection. But yes, TECS, FBI fingerprint, FBI
6	Name Check, and IDENT.
7	Q And then other database systems or
8	background check systems may be run depending on
9	the circumstances in a given case; is that right?
10	A That is correct.
11	Q But there are no other mandatory
12	checks that are required. Am I getting that
13	right?
14	A That is correct.
15	Q Okay. While we're on the subject of
16	IDENT, IDENT is the DHS biometric database,
17	correct?
18	A That is correct.
19	Q And what is USCIS's IDENT for?
20	A For biometrically comparing the
21	applicant information that we receive to other
22	individuals in the system, to identify potential

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Page 63
     fraud, as well as to identify other prior
1
     collections, encounters with the applicant.
                When you say "encounters", do you
 3
     mean -- what do you mean by that?
 4
5
                Typically, I mean other biometric
          Α
     collections by -- typically by DHS.
 6
7
          Q
               Okay.
8
                So their entry at the border, for
9
     example, or at a port of entry.
10
          Q And are you familiar with the database
11
    ADIS, A-D-I-S?
12
                MR. KIPNIS: Objection; scope. You
13
     can answer in your personal capacity.
                THE WITNESS: I am familiar with ADIS.
14
15
    BY MS. PASQUARELLA:
16
                Is that -- is that database reviewed
          Q
     through TECS?
17
18
                MR. KIPNIS: Objection; scope.
19
                THE WITNESS: No, I don't believe so.
20
     Sorry.
21
    BY MS. PASQUARELLA:
22
                Okay. And what is -- what's the
          Q
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Page 64 1 information that USCIS is looking -- is accessing when it -- when it accesses TECS? 3 Information in TECS would typically include prior encounters with law enforcement 5 agencies. So it may include other encounters with Customs & Border Protection. It might 6 include information about other law enforcement 7 investigations for which the applicant is the 8 9 subject, and it may also include information on 10 whether or not the individual is listed as a known or suspected terrorist. 11 12 Okay. Anything else? 13 It is a general law enforcement lookout communication system. So it may have 14 other types of law enforcement lookouts and 15 16 encounter information. But lookouts and encounters is broadly how I would categorize the 17 rest of the information. 18 19 Okay. And what information is USCIS accessing when it -- when it accesses the FBI 20 fingerprint system? 21 22 The FBI's fingerprint system includes Α

Page 65 1 information from the FBI on arrests, as well as state-level information shared by those states 3 with the CJIS, Criminal Justice Information System. 5 Would that be criminal history Q information? 7 Α Yes. 8 And the mandatory checks that we 9 talked about, IDENT checks, FBI Name Check, FBI 10 fingerprint, are those run at the National 11 Benefits Center? 12 MR. KIPNIS: Objection; scope. 13 THE WITNESS: They are -- yes. 14 National Benefits Center runs -- initiates those -- well, no. I apologize. 15 So they do the upfront TECS checks, 16 and they will submit the FBI Name Checks. 17 18 FBI fingerprint checks are initiated when an 19 individual is -- submits their biometric 20 information at one of our applications support centers, though the NBC may review the results of 21 22 those background checks also.

	Page 66
1	BY MS. PASQUARELLA:
2	Q But the initial checks that we talked
3	
4	example, TECS, is that typically run by is
5	that the National Benefits Center that's running
6	them or who's running them?
7	A Yes. The National Benefits Center
8	runs those.
9	Q Okay. And when those initial checks
10	flag something that should be investigated, as a
11	potential indicator of a national security
12	concern, who who then investigates those
13	flags?
14	A The NBC has officers who initially
15	triage
16	MR. KIPNIS: I'm going to object go
17	ahead and answer. I'm sorry. Objection to
18	scope. You can answer.
19	THE WITNESS: I apologize.
20	MR. KIPNIS: No, it's my fault.
21	THE WITNESS:
22	

	Page 148
1	BY MS. PASQUARELLA:
2	Q Okay. I want to talk now about KSTs.
3	What's USCIS's understanding of what it means to
4	be a KST?
5	A A KST, a known or suspected terrorist,
6	is an individual who is known or is reasonably
7	suspected of being engaged in terrorist activity,
8	of being a member of a terrorist organization or
9	planning terrorist activity.
10	Q And who makes the determination about
11	who is a KST?
12	MR. KIPNIS: Based on USCIS's
13	knowledge?
14	MS. PASQUARELLA: Yes.
15	THE WITNESS: Law enforcement and
16	intelligence agencies nominate individuals for
17	placement on the watchlist as a known or
18	suspected terrorist.
19	BY MS. PASQUARELLA:
20	Q And then who decides who actually
21	places them? Who gets to be placed on that
22	watchlist?

	Page 149
1	MR. KIPNIS: Again, USCIS's knowledge
2	on that question?
3	MS. PASQUARELLA: All of these
4	questions are USCIS's knowledge, yes.
5	MR. KIPNIS: Well you're not framing
6	them that way. So that's the issue. I'll make
7	sure that you're getting the answer to the
8	question you're giving.
9	THE WITNESS: The our understanding
10	is that the nominating agency is responsible for
11	determining that an individual is a KST.
12	BY MS. PASQUARELLA:
13	Q
14	
15	
16	A
17	Q
18	
19	
20	MR. KIPNIS:
21	MS. PASQUARELLA:
22	knowledge, yes.

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Page 150
 1
                THE WITNESS: There are guidelines for
 2
     inclusion on the -- on the watchlist, and each
 3
     agency may have its own processes for placing
     those nominations on the watchlist.
5
    BY MS. PASQUARELLA:
                Okay. But my question is, is it
 6
7
    USCIS's understanding that a person who is
    nominated to the watchlist is in fact placed on
8
9
    the watchlist?
10
                MR. KIPNIS: Objection on scope.
    was not -- this is not listed in the topics. So
11
12
    he can answer based on his personal knowledge
13
    but --
14
               MS. PASQUARELLA: This is Topic Number
15
    8, Brian.
16
                MR. KIPNIS: Yes. The question about
    how someone is placed on the watchlist or USCIS's
17
18
     knowledge of that is not part of the topic.
19
                MS. PASQUARELLA: I disagree. It's
20
     about how -- what it means to be a KST and how
21
     they get there.
                MR. KIPNIS: Well, I don't see the how
22
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Page 151
1
     they get there. Anyway, go ahead and answer, if
 2
     you can, Kevin.
 3
                THE WITNESS:
 4
 5
 6
 7
8
    BY MS. PASQUARELLA:
9
          Q
                Does USCIS know what the evidentiary
10
     standard is to nominate someone to the TSDB?
11
          A
                U.S. -- sorry.
12
                MR. KIPNIS: Object to scope.
13
                THE WITNESS: Sorry. USCIS
14
    understands that it is reasonable suspicion.
15
    BY MS. PASQUARELLA:
16
                Okay. And what is USCIS's
     understanding of the reasonable suspicion is
17
     reasonable suspicion of what?
18
19
                MR. KIPNIS: Objection; scope.
20
                THE WITNESS: Reasonable suspicion
     that the individual has participated in -- is --
21
     has conducted or is planning to conduct terrorist
22
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Page 152
1
    activity.
    BY MS. PASQUARELLA:
          O And what is the definition that's used
 3
    of terrorist activity in finding that's there's
5
    reasonable suspicion to place someone on the
    watchlist?
7
               MR. KIPNIS: Objection; scope.
                THE WITNESS: I'm not sure --
8
9
               COURT REPORTER: What was that?
10
               MR. KIPNIS: I objected based on the
11
    lack of foundation also.
                THE WITNESS: And I said I'm not sure
12
13
    what that is.
14
    BY MS. PASQUARELLA:
15
               Okay. Does being a KST satisfy
    CARRP's articulable link standard?
16
17
                COURT REPORTER: I'm sorry. Can you
18
    repeat the question?
19
    BY MS. PASQUARELLA:
20
                Does being a KST satisfy CARRP's
    articulable link standard?
21
                Yes. We consider an individual who is
22
         Α
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Page 153 1 listed as a K -- is a confirmed KST to have an articulable link to national security across 3 USCIS. Why does USCIS think that being an KST satisfies the articulable link standard? 5 6 Because of the -- the -- a person is 7 nominated as a KST if there is a reasonable 8 suspicion, the person has been involved in 9 terrorist activities. Because of that and 10 because terrorist activities are included in INA 212, we consider that to be similar to our own 11 12 articulation of a national security concern for 13 non-KST security concerns. 14 But, again, USCIS doesn't know what definition is applied to terrorist activity when 15 16 an agency nominates someone to the watchlist? 17 MR. KIPNIS: Objection; scope. 18 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. I forget 19 exactly what the definition of terrorism is that 20 they use in the watchlist. 21 BY MS. PASQUARELLA: 22 So you don't know whether that Q



