ACLU Summary of the 1997 Supreme Court Term
June 26, 1998
Steven R. Shapiro
National Legal Director
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
A. Freedom of Speech and Association
B. Double Jeopardy
C. The Taking Clause
A. Trial by Jury
A. Excessive Fines
A. Procedural due process
B. Substantive due process
SEPARATION OF POWERS
STATUTORY DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
A. Title VII
B. Title IX
C. Age Discrimination
D. Americans With Disabilities Act
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
JURISDICTION AND STANDING
A. Freedom of Speech and Association
In National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 66 U.S.L.W. 4586 (June 25, 1998)(8-1), the Court rejected a facial challenge to a congressional statute directing the NEA to take “into consideration general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public.” Writing for the majority, Justice O’Connor narrowly construed the statutory language and thereby avoided the constitutional problems deemed fatal by the lower courts. Under the interpretation adopted by the majority, the statute does not dictate the result of the NEA’s grantmaking process, it merely increases the factors that the agency must weigh in the balance. Seen in this light, Justice O’Connor concluded, “we do not perceive a realistic danger that [the statute] will compromise First Amendment values.” Id. at 4589. At the same time, she cautioned, the constitutional calculus would be very different “[i]f the NEA were to leverage its power to award subsidies on the basis of subjective criteria into a penalty on disfavored viewpoints.” Id. at 4591. Only Justices Scalia and Thomas took the position that the First Amendment is irrelevant to the NEA’s funding decisions. In a lone dissent, Justice Souter disagreed with the majority’s interpretation of the statute, which he regarded as clearly intended to suppress unpopular views and thus a violation of the First Amendment. The ACLU was co-counsel for plaintiffs challenging the statute.
In Arkansas Educational Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 66 U.S.L.W. 4360 (May 18, 1998)(6-3), the Court upheld the exclusion of a minor party candidate for Congress from a televised debate sponsored by a public broadcasting station operated by the state. The majority opinion began by noting that the broadcast decisions of even a state-owned television station will rarely be subject to First Amendment scrutiny. However, Justice Kennedy added, candidate debates present “a narrow exception to this rule,” id. at 4362. Accordingly, any decision to exclude a candidate from a televised debate must be viewpoint neutral. The Court nonetheless upheld the decision to exclude Forbes because it was ostensibly based on his lack of public support rather than his political views. In dissent, Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg argued that the station’s decision was constitutionally flawed because it was standardless and therefore subject to abuse. The ACLU submitted an amicus brief agreeing with the test applied by the majority but disagreeing with its conclusion that an exclusion based on “political viability” is viewpoint neutral.
Federal Election Comm’n v. Akins, 66 U.S.L.W. 4426 (June 1, 1998)(6-3) — see summary on p.18.
In United States v. Ramirez, 66 U.S.L.W. 4169 (March 4, 1998)(9-0), a unanimous Court held that the assessment of whether exigent circumstances exist permitting the police to execute a search warrant without first knocking and announcing their presence does not depend on whether the police “must destroy property in order to enter.” Id. at 4171. The Court then held that the police had satisfied the exigent circumstances exception in this case since they were searching for a prison escapee with a violent record and access to a large supply of weapons.
In Pennsylvania Board of Probation v. Scott, 66 U.S.L.W. 4524 (June 22, 1998)(5-4), the Court held that the exclusionary rule does not apply in parole revocation hearings. Stressing that the exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy rather than a constitutional right, the majority opinion, written by Justice Thomas, concluded that the costs of applying the exclusionary rule to parole revocation hearings outweighed any “marginal” deterrent effect. Justice Souter disagreed, arguing in dissent that revocation is the real threat hanging over most parolees, and thus the fact that illegally seized evidence will not be admissible in a criminal trial is no deterrent at all for most parole officers. The ACLU submitted an amicus brief in support of the parolee in this case.
In United States v. Balsys, 66 U.S.L.W. 4613 (June 25, 1998) (7-2), the Court held that a witness who fears prosecution by a foreign government cannot invoke the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination in response to questions by United States government officials. The Court thus rejected the Fifth Amendment claim of a suspected Nazi who declined to answer questions during a deportation investigation because he feared prosecution for his wartime activities if sent back to Europe.
Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, 66 U.S.L.W. 4226 (March 25, 1998)(8-1) — see summary on p.7.
B. Double Jeopardy
In Hudson v. United States, 66 U.S.L.W. 4024 (Dec. 10, 1997) (9-0), the Court refined its test for determining when the Double Jeopardy Clause applies to successive civil and criminal proceedings. Under United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989), the critical question for determining whether a nominally civil penalty is actually criminal in nature, and thus triggers double jeopardy, is whether the sanction imposed is so disproportionate to the government’s actual loss that it can properly be classified as punitive. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist expressly “disavow[ed]” the reasoning of Halper, 66 U.S.L.W. at 4025, and held that the civil or criminal nature of a given punishment should normally be determined by examining a statute on its face, and that the “clearest proof” is necessary to conclude that a statute described as civil by the legislature is in fact punitive. Four Justices concurred in the result but disagreed with the majority’s overemphasis on labels.
In Monge v. California, 66 U.S.L.W. 4628 (June 26, 1998) (5-4), the Court held that Double Jeopardy Clause does not prevent the state from introducing new evidence regarding a defendant’s past convictions in order to invoke the enhanced sentencing provisions of California’s “three strike” law.
C. The Takings Clause
In Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation, 66 U.S.L.W. 4468 (June 15, 1998)(5-4), the Court considered a constitutional challenge to so-called IOLTA programs, which now exist throughout the country. (The acronym stands for Interest on Lawyers Trust Accounts.) Under IOLTA, lawyers are required to pool any client funds that will not generate net interest on their own in a single account whose cumulative interest is then used by th`e state to fund legal services. Plaintiffs claimed that this scheme violated the Takings Clause. The majority opinion, however, never reached that ultimate issue, which it did not view as properly presented by the record in this case. Thus, while the majority agreed that plaintiffs had raised a valid property claim, it sent the case back to the lower courts to determine whether plaintiffs’ property had in fact been “taken” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment and, if so, whether any compensation was due. Even under the majority’s view, plaintiffs will only be entitled to relief if both questions are ultimately answered yes. Nevertheless, the dissenters took issue with what they described as the majority’s “abstract” approach on two main grounds. First, they argued that the question of whether there is a property interest should not be divorced from the question of whether there has been a “taking.” Second, they disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that plaintiffs had a property claim on interest that would not have existed but for the IOLTA program.
In Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 66 U.S.L.W. 4566 (June 25, 1998)(5-4), a sharply divided Court struck down a 1992 federal act designed to guarantee health care benefits for retired coal miners. As a result of the Act, plaintiff was required to pay a health care premium for 1,000 miners who it had employed prior to 1966, even though the company was no longer in the coal business. A four-person plurality concluded that the statute violated the Takings Clause. Justice Kennedy, who provided the crucial fifth vote, rejected the Takings Clause claim but held that the retroactive application of the Act violated the Due Process Clause.
In Gray v. Maryland, 66 U.S.L.W. 4202 (March 9, 1998)(5-4), the Court held that the rule of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), which bars the prosecution from introducing the confession of a non-testifying defendant if it explicitly incrimi- nates a co-defendant, also bars the introduction of a confession in which the name of the co-defendant has simply been replaced with the word “deleted,” as in this case. Writing for the Court, Justice Breyer concluded that, even though the link to the co-defendant was inferential rather than explicit, the Confrontation Clause problems are the same, and a limiting instruction is insufficient. The Court specifically distinguished situations in which not only the name but the existence of the co-defendant has been redacted.
In United States v. Sheffer, 66 U.S.L.W. 4235 (March 31, 1998)(8-1), the Court upheld the constitutionality of Military Rule of Evidence 707, which prohibits the use of polygraph evidence in any court martial even when, as here, the evidence is offered by the defendant to bolster his credibility. Emphasizing the continuing debate over the reliability of polygraphs, Judge Thomas rejected the claim that a per se rule of exclusion violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to present a full defense.
A. Trial By Jury
In Hetzel v. Prince William County, 66 U.S.L.W. 3618 (March 23, 1998)(9-0)(per curiam), a Title VII case, the Court unanimously ruled that monetary damages awarded by the jury at trial cannot be reduced on appeal without giving plaintiff the option of a retrial. Otherwise, the Court wrote, the appellate remittitur deprives plaintiff of the right to trial by jury, a result that “cannot be squared with the Seventh Amendment.” Id. at 3619.
In Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 66 U.S.L.W. 4245 (March 31, 1998)(9-0), a unanimous Court held that the Seventh Amendment guarantees a copyright plaintiff the right to a jury trial on the amount of statutory damages. Writing for the Court, Justice Thomas focused the inquiry on the existence of analogous causes of action under the common law prior to adoption of the Seventh Amendment.
A. Excessive Fines
In United States v. Bajakajian, 66 U.S.L.W. 4514 (June 22, 1998)(5-4), the Court held that the defendant’s willful failure to comply with a federal law that requires travelers to report all cash that they are taking out of the country in excess of $10,000 did not entitle the government to seize the entire $357,144 that the defendant had in his possession when he was arrested. Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas described the punishment in this case as “grossly disproportionate” to the crime and thus unconstitutional. The decision marks the first time that the Court has ever struck down a fine under the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause.
In Buchanan v. Angelone, 66 U.S.L.W. 4075 (Jan. 21, 1998) (6-3), the Court ruled that the Constitution does not dictate the manner in which a capital sentencing jury considers mitigating evidence and, accordingly, upheld a death sentence imposed by a jury that had been presented with mitigating evidence but never specifically instructed on its obligation to weigh that mitigating evidence against the aggravating circumstances presented by the prosecution. The dissent disagreed on the significance of counsel’s statements to the jury. As Justice Breyer noted, “[t]he jury will look to the judge, not to counsel, for authoritative direction about what it is to do with the evidence that it hears.” Id. at 4080.
In Calderon v. Thompson, 66 U.S.L.W. 4301 (April 29, 1998) (5-4), the Court ruled that the Ninth Circuit had committed a “grave abuse of discretion,” id. at 4302, by recalling its mandate in this habeas corpus action two days before Thompson’s scheduled execution. In an opinion that emphasized the values of finality and federalism, the Court held that the decision to recall the mandate in a habeas corpus proceeding should be “informed” by the standards for successive habeas petitions set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, even though it is not technically governed by them. Specifically, Justice Kennedy concluded that the recall of the mandate was an abuse of discretion in this case since the evidence presented by the petitioner did not establish his actual innocence. Although sharing the majority’s dismay over the timing of the recall, Justice Souter’s dissent criticized the majority for confusing the merits of the case with the propriety of the recall. “The issue on abuse of discretion review,” he wrote, “is simply whether those voting to recall the mandate to allow en banc review could reasonably have thought that the earlier panel had been mistaken . . . .” Id. at 4310.
In Hopkins v. Reeves, 66 U.S.L.W. 4449 (June 8, 1998)(8-1), the Court upheld a death sentence following a conviction for felony-murder despite the fact that the trial judge rejected the defendant’s request for a jury instruction on lesser-included offenses. The defendant argued that this failure entitled him to relief under Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980). Writing for the majority, however, Justice Thomas distinguished Beck on the ground that the Alabama law on lesser-included offenses discriminated against capital defendants while the Nebraska law did not. Thus, in Justice Thomas’ view, the defendant in Beck was merely seeking equal treatment under state law while the defendant in this case was seeking special treatment. In failing to appreciate this distinction, he wrote, the decision by the Eighth Circuit to grant a writ of habeas corpus “limited state sovereignty in a manner more severe than the rule in Beck.” Id. at 4451.
Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 66 U.S.L.W. 4352 (May 18, 1998)(7-2) — see summary on p.13.
Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, 66 U.S.L.W. 4226 (March 25, 1998)(8-1) — see summary on p.7.
In George v. Voinovich, 66 U.S.L.W. 3619 (March 23, 1998), the Court declined to review a Sixth Circuit decision striking down an Ohio ban on so-called partial birth abortions. Among other things, the statute made it a crime for a doctor to perform a post-viability abortion unless the doctor believed, “in good faith and in the exercise of his best medical judgment,” that the abortion was necessary to save the woman’s life or prevent a serious risk to the woman’s physical health. The Sixth Circuit ruled that the statute was unconstitutionally vague, as well as inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent because it did not contain a mental health exception. In a dissent from the denial of certiorari, Justice Thomas challenged both prongs of the Sixth Circuit’s ruling. His dissent was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia.
In Miller v. Albright, 66 U.S.L.W. 4266 (April 22, 1998) (6-3), the Court, in a badly fractured decision, rejected a challenge to 8 U.S.C. §1409, which imposes more onerous requirements on a foreign-born child claiming citizenship through an American father rather than an American mother. Specifically, citizenship can be claimed through the father only if paternity is established before the child is 18, and the father agrees to support the child until she is 18. Neither requirement applies if citizenship is claimed through an American mother. Justice Stevens, joined by the Chief Justice, held that this gender discrimination served important governmental interests and thus survived heightened scrutiny. Justices Scalia and Thomas concurred in the judgment on the ground that the courts could not confer citizenship beyond what Congress had authorized and thus no remedy was possible. Justices O’Connor and Kennedy agreed with the dissent that heightened scrutiny was appropriate and that the statute failed heightened scrutiny. They nonetheless concurred in the judgment on the theory that the child plaintiff in this case lacked standing to raise the gender discrimination claim that belonged to the father. Justices Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer dissented. In their view, the statute could not survive the heightened scrutiny that properly applied. Thus, five Justices concluded that the statute represented a form of unconstitutional gender discrimination. However, the statute survived this particular challenge because two of the five decided that the wrong party had sued. The ACLU filed an amicus brief arguing that the statute was unconstitutional.
Campbell v. Louisiana, 66 U.S.L.W. 4258 (April 21, 1998) (9-0) — see summary on p.17.
A. Procedural due process
In Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, 66 U.S.L.W. 4226 (March 25, 1998)(8-1), the Court rejected a due process challenge to Ohio’s clemency procedures in death cases. In an opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, four members of the Court concluded that due process does not apply to executive clemency. In a separate opinion written by Justice O’Connor, four other members of the Court concluded that due process does require at least minimum safeguards in the clemency process, however discretionary the final decision may be. They nonetheless concurred in the judgment because of their view that Ohio’s clemency procedures satisfied this due process standard. Justice Stevens agreed with Justice O’Connor that due process applied (forming a majority of five on this point), but dissented on the ground that the lower courts should determine in the first instance whether due process had been met. All nine Justices rejected Woodard’s additional claim that Ohio’s procedures unconstitutionally forced him to choose between appearing before the clemency board and his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. According to the Court, this choice is no different than the choice every criminal defendant faces when choosing whether to testify at trial. The ACLU submitted an amicus brief supporting Woodard’s due process claim.
Campbell v. Louisiana, 66 U.S.L.W. 4258 (April 21, 1998) (9-0) —see summary on p.17.
B. Substantive due process
In County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 66 U.S.L.W. 4407 (May 26, 1998)(9-0), the Court ruled that a high speed police chase violates substantive due process only if the police act with a “purpose to cause harm.” Id. at 4408. Writing for the majority, Justice Souter stressed that substantive due process claims are limited to “egregious” government conduct that “shocks the conscience.” Id. at 4411. The Court therefore rejected the “deliberate indifference” test applied by the Ninth Circuit. Although the Court divided on the appropriate criteria for determining whether particular conduct “shocks the conscience,” all eight Justices who addressed the question agreed that the standard had not been met in this case.
In Baker v. General Motors Corp., 66 U.S.L.W. 4060 (Jan. 13, 1998)(9-0), a unanimous Court held that a Michigan injunction prohibiting a former GM employee from testifying against the company without its permission did not apply to a subsequent Missouri litigation brought by third parties who were strangers to the Michigan decree. GM’s attempt to enforce the injunction relied on the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Writing for the majority, however, Justice Ginsburg explained that the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not apply in these circumstances because the Michigan court never had jurisdiction over the Missouri plaintiffs, and thus there was no judgment against them that could or should be enforced. At the same time, Justice Ginsburg rejected the notion of a general public policy exception in cases where the Full Faith and Credit Clause would otherwise apply.
Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corrections v. Yeskey, 66 U.S.L.W. 4481 (June 15, 1998)(9-0) — see summary on p.11.
In City of Monroe v. United States, 66 U.S.L.W. 3351 (Nov. 14, 1997)(7-2), the Court once again overruled the Justice Department’s interpretation of the preclearance requirements under §5 of the Voting Rights Act. Specifically, the Court held that the City of Monroe did not have to seek preclearance of its majority vote rule for municipal elections because DOJ had effectively approved the rule by preclearing a Georgia state statute which provides that the majority vote rule will govern in any municipality that does not have a contrary rule in its city charter. The Court’s per curiam opinion reached this result by distinguishing its prior decision narrowly interpreting the same state statute in City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
In Foster v. Love, 66 U.S.L.W. 4015 (Dec. 2, 1997)(9-0), a unanimous Court struck down Louisiana’s “open primary” system as it applied to congressional candidates. Under the Louisiana system, any congressional candidate who received more than 50% of the votes in an October primary election was “elected” to office and no further election was held in November. Sweeping aside the state’s “invocations of state sovereignty,” id. at 4016, the Court held that Louisiana’s scheme conflicted with federal law, which mandates a uniform date for congressional elections on the Tuesday after the first Monday in November.
In Texas v. United States, 66 U.S.L.W. 4234 (March 31, 1998)(9-0), the Court unanimously ruled that the question whether §5 of the Voting Rights Act compelled preclearance of a state statute that permitted, but did not require, the state to supplant an underperforming school board with a special master or a management team was not ripe for adjudication because the statute had not yet been implemented. The ACLU submitted an amicus brief arguing that the state’s complaint had not been appropriately brought under §5.
In Clinton v. New York, 66 U.S.L.W. 4543 (June 25, 1998) (6-3), the Court struck down the Line Item Veto Act as a viola tion of Article I, §7 of the Constitution. As Justice Stevens explained for the majority, the so-called Presentment Clause sets forth the exclusive procedure for enacting laws, which requires the President to either sign or veto a bill that has been adopted by both Houses of Congress. According to the majority, the President’s use of the line item veto in this case “amended two Acts of Congress by repealing a portion of each.” Id. at 4543. This process is unconstitutional, the Court ruled, because “[t]here is no provision in the Constitution that authorizes the President to enact, to amend, or to repeal statutes.” Id. The dissenters did not quarrel with that principle, merely its application to these facts. In their view, the President was merely exercising power delegated by Congress when he invoked the Line Item Veto Act.
In LaChance v. Erickson, 66 U.S.L.W. 4073 (Jan. 21, 1998) (9-0), the Court unanimously rejected a due process challenge to the government’s right to penalize its employees for lying during an internal investigation. Quoting its earlier decision in Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64, 72 (1969), the Court held that “[o]ur legal system provides methods for challenging the government’s right to ask questions — lying is not one of them.”
In Crawford-el v. Britton, 66 U.S.L.W. 4311 (May 4, 1998) (5-4), the Court held that the D.C. Circuit erred in requiring §1983 plaintiffs to prove their case by “clear and convincing evidence,” rather than a mere preponderance, whenever the alleged constitutional violation turns on the defendant’s state of mind. Although expressing sympathy with the concern that allegations of improper intent are easy to assert and hard to disprove, Justice Stevens’ majority opinion also stressed the “social costs” associated with placing new and serious limitations on “the only realistic remedy” for many constitutional violations. Finally, Justice Stevens concluded (and Justice Kennedy emphasized in a concurring opinion), that the lower court had exceeded its authority in subjecting §1983 plaintiffs to a heightened burden of proof without legislative authorization. In dissent, Justices Scalia and Thomas rejected the entire modern development of §1983 law by questioning whether the statute was ever intended to provide a remedy for the unlawful acts of government officials. The ACLU submitted an amicus brief urging the Court to hold, as it did, that §1983 plaintiffs could not be subject by judicial fiat to onerous burdens of proof that Congress had never imposed.
STATUTORY DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
A. Title VII
In Faragher v. Boca Raton, 66 U.S.L.W. 4643 (June 26, 1998) (7-2), the Court for the first time announced a clear set of rules for determining an employer’s liability under Title VII when its employees are subject to sexual harassment by their supervisors. Applying traditional agency principles, the Court ruled that an employee who rejects the sexual advances of a supervisor and suffers adverse job consequences as a result — such as dismissal, demotion or denial of a merited raise — may always hold the employer liable because the decision to impose those job consequences is, in effect, a decision of the employer. In situations where the employee does not suffer such tangible consequences, the Court wrote, an employer is still presumptively liable but that presumption may be rebutted if the employer can prove that it took reasonable steps to prevent and correct any harassment (including the promulgation of an appropriate sexual harassment policy), and that the employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of the employer’s complaint procedures. In this case, the Court ruled, the employer had never taken steps to prevent a hostile work environment and thus should be held liable for the harassment that plaintiff suffered. The ACLU submitted an amicus brief supporting plaintiff’s harassment claim.
In Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, 66 U.S.L.W. 4634 (June 26, 1998)(7-2), the Court reiterated its holding in Faragher. In an opinion written by Justice Kennedy, the Court also made clear that a threat of adverse job action can give rise to a claim of sexual harassment even if the threat is not carried through, but that such claims only give rise to a presumption of employer liability because they are properly treated as a form of hostile work environment (if sufficiently severe and pervasive).
In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 66 U.S.L.W. 4172 (March 4, 1998)(9-0), the Court unanimously ruled that Title VII prohibits sexual harassment in the workplace — whether it is between members of the same sex or opposite sexes — if it is sufficiently pervasive or severe to alter the conditions of employment and if it can fairly be described as discrimination “on the basis of sex.” That does not mean, however, that every comment with a sexual connotation is a form of sexual harassment, or that Title VII represents “a general civility code for the American workplace.” Instead, Justice Scalia explained for the Court, the boundaries of Title VII can best be determined through the use of “[c]ommon sense, and an appropriate sensitivity to social context.” The ACLU submitted an amicus brief urging the Court to reverse the lower court’s per se rule that same-sex harassment was never covered by Title VII.
B. Title IX
In Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 66 U.S.L.W. 4501 (June 22, 1998)(5-4), the Court ruled that a student who is sexually harassed by her teacher has no remedy against the school district unless the district knew of the harassment and was “deliberately indifferent” to what was occurring. Writing for the majority, Justice O’Connor concluded that the most plausible reading of the statute was that Congress intended to create the same set of rules for a private right of action as for a federal cause of action, and that in the latter situation Congress had specifically required proof of actual notice to the school district. Justice Stevens, who wrote the principal dissent, read the legislative history very differently. In addition, he accused the majority of effectively overruling its decision in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60 (1992), by depriving Title IX plaintiffs of any meaningful opportunity to sue for damages. Justice Ginsburg (joined by Justices Souter and Breyer) added an important caveat to Justice Stevens’ opinion. School districts should not face liability under Title IX, she argued in a separate dissent, if they have a reasonable complaint procedure that the plaintiff chooses to ignore.
C. Age Discrimination
In Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 66 U.S.L.W. 4118 (Jan. 26, 1998)(6-3), the Court held that an employee who accepted a severance package and signed a release could nonetheless sue under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) without returning the money she received if the release did not meet the requirements of the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA). As Justice Kennedy explained, the OWBPA “governs the effect of the release on ADEA claims, and the employer cannot invoke the employee’s failure to tender back as a way of excusing its own failure to comply.” Id. at 4119.
D. Americans with Disabilities Act
In Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corrections v. Yeskey, 66 U.S.L.W. 4481 (June 15, 1998)(9-0), the Court unanimously ruled that state prisons are covered by Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which prohibits “public entities” from discriminating against “qualified individuals” on the basis of their disability. The Court expressly reserved decision, however, on the question of whether Congress acted within its constitutional authority when it applied the ADA to state prisons. As Justice Scalia explained for the Court, that issue was not addressed by either of the lower courts in this case. The ACLU submitted an amicus brief urging the statutory construction that the Court ultimately adopted.
In Bragdon v. Abbott, 66 U.S.L.W. 4601 (June 25, 1998)(5-4), the Court ruled that HIV is a disability within the meaning of the ADA, even at its early stages. The ADA defines “disability” as a physical impairment that substantially limits a major life activity. Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy had little trouble holding that HIV is a physical impairment. He also agreed with plaintiff’s contention that reproduction is a major life activity. Finally, he ruled that the risk that an infected woman will transmit the virus to her child and/or sexual partner represents a substantial limitation on her ability to reproduce. The Court nevertheless remanded the case to determine whether the defendant’s refusal to treat plaintiff in his dental office was objectively reasonable in light of the scientific evidence available at the time. The ACLU submitted an amicus brief urging the Court to classify HIV as a disability under the ADA.
In Kalina v. Fletcher, 66 U.S.L.W. 4031 (Dec. 10, 1997) (9-0), the Court unanimously held that a prosecutor who makes false statements in an affidavit supporting an arrest warrant is not entitled to absolute immunity when later sued for damages under §1983. Continuing its functional approach to immunity questions, the Court ruled that the prosecutor in these circumstances is only entitled to the same qualified immunity that would apply to any other witness.
In Bogan v .Scott-Harris, 66 U.S.L.W. 4163 (March 3, 1998) (9-0), a unanimous Court ruled that local legislators have the same right to absolute immunity from damage actions for their legislative acts that previous Court rulings had already extended to federal, state, and regional legislators. In addition, the Court held that “[w]hether an act is legislative turns on the nature of the act, rather than on the motive or intent of the official performing it.” Id. at 4166. Finally, the Court held that legislative immunity protects anyone involved in the legislative process, including the city mayor in this case who signed the ordinance that plaintiff challenged.
Miller v. Albright, 66 U.S.L.W. 4266 (April 22, 1998)(6-3) — see summary on p.6.
In Trest v. Cain, 66 U.S.L.W. 4023 (Dec. 9, 1997)(9-0), a unanimous Court ruled that a federal court of appeals is not required to raise the question of procedural default on its own if the state does not raise it. The Court declined to decide whether a federal court of appeals may raise the procedural default issue sua sponte.
In Spencer v. Kemna, 66 U.S.L.W. 4152 (March 2, 1998)(8-1), the Court held that a prisoner’s habeas corpus challenge to his parole revocation becomes moot when the prisoner’s term expires unless the habeas petitioner is able to point to some ongoing collateral consequences that flow from the parole revocation. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia specifically declined to extend the presumption of collateral consequences that the Court has applied to criminal conviction to the parole revocation at issue in this case. In separate concurring opinions, Justices Souter and Ginsburg expressed the view (apparently shared by at least four, and perhaps five members of the Court), that Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), would not foreclose a subsequent damages action under §1983 because, as a result of the Court’s holding, the petitioner in this case could no longer pursue the habeas remedy that Heck presumed was available.
In Bousley v. United States, 66 U.S.L.W. 4346 (May 18, 1998) (7-2), the Court considered whether a defendant who pled guilty to “using” a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §924(c)(1) — an offense punishable by five additional years in prison — could later claim on habeas review that his guilty plea was involuntary because it was based on a prevailing view of the elements of the offense that was later overturned by the Supreme Court in Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995). Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist began by recognizing that a guilty plea that rests on a defendant’s mistaken understanding of the elements of the offense is involuntary, and thus invalid. He also agreed with the defendant that his involuntariness claim was not barred by Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), because the principle that involuntary pleas are invalid was not “new,” and because Teague only applies to procedural rules and not to changes in substantive law. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit decision dismissing the habeas petition was reversed. At the same time, the majority ruled that Bousley’s failure to challenge his guilty plea on direct appeal represented a procedural default, that the broadly held misunderstanding about the reach of §924(c)(1) did not constitute “cause” for failing to object to the sentencing court’s erroneous explanation of the statute’s meaning, and that Bousley’s ability to pursue his habeas claim therefore depended on whether he could establish his “actual innocence,” both of the “use” charge as well as any charge that the government abandoned as part of the plea bargain. The ACLU submitted an amicus brief urging that the habeas petition be granted.
In Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 66 U.S.L.W. 4352 (May 18, 1998)(7-2), the Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit that the strict rules governing “second or successive” habeas petitions did not apply when respondent’s previous effort to challenge his competency to be executed under Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), was dismissed as premature by the district court. Noting that respondent had never been given an opportunity to adjudicate his Ford claim on the merits, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that an interpretation of the habeas rules that now barred him from litigating the claim would have “far-reaching and seemingly perverse” implications. Id. at 4353. The ACLU submitted an amicus brief supporting respondent’s right to raise his Ford claim.
Calderon v. Ashmus, 66 U.S.L.W. 4382 (May 26, 1998)(9-0) — see summary on p.18.
Hohn v. United States, 66 U.S.L.W. 4489 (July 15, 1998)(5-4) — see summary on p.18.
In Bates v. United States, 66 U.S.L.W. 4006 (Nov. 4, 1997) (9-0), the Court unanimously held that the government is not required to prove intent to defraud in order to convict a defendant under 20 U.S.C. §1097(a), which makes it a crime to “knowingly and willfully” misapply federally insured student loan funds.
In Salinas v. United States, 66 U.S.L.W. 4011 (Dec. 2, 1997)(9-0), a unanimous Court ruled that a state official who accepts a bribe while employed by an agency that receives federal funds is guilty of violating the bribery provisions of 18 U.S.C. §666, even if there is no proof that the bribe affected the federal funds. The Court also held that RICO’s conspiracy provisions do not require proof that the defendant either committed, or agreed to commit, two predicate offenses; it is sufficient if the defendant agreed to the creation of the criminal enterprise under RICO.
In Brogan v. United States, 66 U.S.L.W. 4111 (Jan. 26, 1998) (7-2), the Court held that a simple denial of wrongdoing, or “exculpatory no,” can constitute a violation of 18 U.S.C. §1001, which prohibits “any” intentionally false statement to a federal officer. The majority opinion, written by Justice Scalia, emphasized the broad wording of the statute. In a separate concurrence, Justice Ginsburg agreed that the statute was broadly written but expressed concern that its breadth invited prosecutorial overreaching. Her opinion invited Congress to reexamine the statute.
In Lewis v. United States, 66 U.S.L.W. 4194 (March 9, 1998) (8-1), the Court considered the impact of the Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA), 18 U.S.C. §13(a), on the murder conviction and life sentence of a defendant charged with committing murder on a federal army base located in Louisiana. The ACA, which was first adopted in 1825, provides that anyone who commits a crime that is not covered by federal law on a federal enclave (such as an army base) can be charged under the relevant state law. Construing the statute’s ambiguous language, Justice Breyer held that the ACA requires a court to engage in a two-step analysis: Is there “any” federal law that applies to the defendant’s conduct and, if so, would reliance on state law interfere with some federal policy? Utilizing this quasi-preemption analysis, the Court then concluded that the defendant in this case was improperly prosecuted under Louisiana’s first degree murder statute since Congress had, in fact, adopted a comprehensive murder statute for federal enclaves that would have designated defendant’s crime as second degree murder. However, because the jury’s finding of first degree murder under state law included all the elements needed to find second degree murder under federal law, the Court agreed with the Fifth Circuit’s view that defendant’s conviction under state law could be converted into a conviction under federal law. Finally, the Court remanded for resentencing since the state law rule of mandatory life imprisonment for first degree murder had been erroneously applied to defendant’s redesignated conviction under federal law.
In Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 66 U.S.L.W. 4213 (March 24, 1998)(5-4), the Court considered a federal statute providing that a deported alien who reenters the country without permission is subject to two years in jail unless the alien was deported after conviction for an aggravated felony, in which case the potential criminal penalty increases to twenty years. The majority opinion, written by Justice Breyer, held that the enhanced penalty is a sentencing provision rather than an element of the crime, and thus does not need to be mentioned in the indictment or found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Furthermore, Justice Breyer concluded that this interpretation of the statute did not raise any constitutional doubts. The dissent, written by Justice Scalia (and joined by Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg), disagreed on both counts.
In Edwards v. United States, 66 U.S.L.W. 4293 (April 26, 1998)(9-0), the Court unanimously held that a defendant convicted of conspiracy to distribute crack or cocaine (based on an ambiguous jury charge) could be sentenced for both crack and cocaine if, as here, the evidence at trial supported that conclusion. Writing for the Court, Justice Breyer explained that “the Sentencing Guidelines require the sentencing judge, not the jury, to determine both the kind and the amount of drugs at issue in a drug conspiracy.” Id. at 4294.
In Muscarello v. United States, 66 U.S.L.W. 4459 (June 8, 1998)(5-4), a closely divided Court held that the presence of a gun in the glove compartment or trunk of a car where drugs are also found is sufficient to convict a defendant of “carrying” a gun during a drug offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. §924(c), even though the gun was not on the defendant’s person and may not have been immediately accessible. The Court’s approach to this statutory construction issue contrasts with its decision in Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), which narrowly construed the companion term “using” in the same statute.
In Bryan v. United States, 66 U.S.L.W. 4475 (June 15, 1998) (6-3), the Court held that a defendant who “willfully” engages in the illegal sale of guns can be convicted for selling guns without a federal license even if the defendant was unaware of the need to obtain a federal license under 18 U.S.C. §924.
In Caron v. United States, 66 U.S.L.W. 4511 (June 22, 1998) (6-3), the Court held that the defendant was properly subject to an enhanced sentence under the federal armed career criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. §924(c), which is triggered by three prior violent felony convictions. The defendant argued that his prior state law convictions should not count because Massachusetts had restored his civil rights. Writing for the majority, however, Justice Kennedy rejected that contention. Federal law specifi cally provides that a state’s restoration of civil rights shall not affect the calculation of prior felony convictions under §924(c) if the state has simultaneously stipulated that the defendant may not possess “firearms.” Here, Massachusetts had stipulated that the defendant could not possess “handguns.” According to the majority, that stipulation was sufficient even though the defendant was ultimately convicted of possessing “rifles,” which Massachusetts had not forbidden when it restored his civil rights.
In New Mexico v. Reed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3780 (June 8, 1998)(9-0), a unanimous Court ruled that New Mexico improperly considered the adequacy of Ohio’s parole revocation procedures in rejecting Ohio’s request to extradite a fugitive parolee. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that any objection to the constitutionality of Ohio’s procedures should have been raised in Ohio, not New Mexico.
In General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 66 U.S.L.W. 4036 (Dec. 15, 1997)(9-0), the Court unanimously held that district court decisions to admit or exclude expert testimony under the Daubert test should be reviewed on appeal under an abuse of discretion standard.
In Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 66 U.S.L.W. 4538 (June 25, 1998)(6-3), the Court held that the attorney-client privilege survives death and cannot be overridden even by a grand jury subpoena. In an opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court therefore ruled that the Independent Counsel’s office could not compel the production of interview notes taken by the attorney for presidential aide Vincent Foster prior to Foster’s death.
In State Oil Co. v. Khan, 66 U.S.L.W. 4001 (Nov. 4, 1997) (9-0), the Court overruled its prior decision in Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968), and held that vertical maximum price fixing would no longer be regarded as a per se violation of the antitrust laws. Although repeating its traditional reluctance to overrule statutory interpretation cases, the Court’s opinion, written by Justice O’Connor, stressed that “stare decisis is not an inexorable command.” Id. at 4006. In this case, the Court noted, the theory of Albrecht had been “eroded” in subsequent cases so “there is not much of that decision to salvage.” Id.
In Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. Miller, 66 U.S.L.W. 4416 (May 26, 1998)(7-2), the Court ruled that pilots who are represented by a union for collective bargaining purposes, but who never joined the union, cannot be compelled by union rules to arbitrate disputes over the appropriate agency fee for activities germane to the collective bargaining agreement. As nonunion members, Justice Ginsburg wrote, plaintiffs are entitled to pursue their refund claim through litigation rather than arbitration, if they so choose.
In Jefferson v. Tarrant, 66 U.S.L.W. 4019 (Dec. 9, 1997) (8-1), the Court held that the final judgment rule precluded review of an interlocutory decision from the Alabama Supreme Court that construed the state’s wrongful death statute to bar any damages against a city on a related §1983 claim. Writing for the majority, Justice Ginsburg held that the case “was brought to this Court too soon,” id. at 4020, because the disposition of the outstanding state claims could eliminate any need to reach the federal question.
In National Credit Union Administration v. First National Bank & Trust Co., 66 U.S.L.W. 4134 (Feb. 25, 1998)(5-4), the Court broadly construed the “zone of interests” test for prudential standing in a dispute between commercial banks and federal credit unions.
In Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 66 U.S.L.W. 4174 (March 4, 1998)(9-0), the Court unanimously agreed that a suit brought by an environmental watchdog group under the Environmental Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (ERCPRA) should be dismissed. The Court was divided, however, on the reasoning. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia held that the question of whether a plaintiff has standing is an “antecedent” issue that must be decided before addressing whether plaintiff has stated a claim for relief under the statute. In this case, Justice Scalia concluded, plaintiff did not have standing because the relief plaintiff sought would not “redress” the injuries it had allegedly suffered. In particular, plaintiff had alleged only past injuries but sought only prospective relief. In separate concurrences, Justices O’Connor, Kennedy and Breyer, agreed that the jurisdictional question of standing should normally be resolved first but stopped short of endorsing Justice Scalia’s absolute rule. Justice Stevens (joined in part by Justices Souter and Ginsburg) concurred in the result but took a different approach entirely. Because he believed the statute did not authorize a claim for past violations, he would have dismissed the action on the merits without ever reaching the standing question on the theory that constitutional issues should be avoided, where possible.
In Campbell v. Louisiana, 66 U.S.L.W. 4258 (April 21, 1998) (9-0), the Court unanimously held that, given the particular features of the Louisiana grand jury system, a white defendant has standing to challenge alleged racial discrimination in the selection of the grand jury foreperson. Unlike most judicial systems, the foreperson in Louisiana is chosen by the judge before the remaining grand jury members are selected by lot. Because of this procedure, Justice Kennedy explained, it is appropriate “to treat the case as one alleging discriminatory selection of grand jurors,” id. at 4260, not merely discriminatory selection of the foreperson. All nine Justices agreed that the defendant had standing to raise his own due process claim under the circumstances. Seven Justices also agreed that the defendant had third party standing to raise the equal protection rights of any black grand juror who was disqualified from serving as foreperson because of his or her race.
In Calderon v. Ashmus, 66 U.S.L.W. 4382 (May 26, 1998)(9-0), the Court unanimously rejected an effort by California’s death row inmates to obtain a declaratory judgment determining whether California had satisfied the conditions for imposing expedited habeas corpus procedures under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. Specifically, the Court held that the request for a declaratory judgment in these circumstances did not meet the “case or controversy” requirements of Article III. As Chief Justice Rehnquist explained, a decision in plaintiffs’ favor would merely establish the ground rules for future habeas actions without providing any plaintiff with conclusive relief. The Court thus characterized the action as akin to seeking an advisory opinion.
In Federal Election Comm’n v. Akins, 66 U.S.L.W. 4426 (June 1, 1998)(6-3), the Court held that a group of voters had standing to challenge the FEC’s determination that the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) was not a “political committee” for purposes of the recordkeeping and disclosure requirements of the Federal Elections Campaign Act. Justice Breyer explained that, because the disclosure provisions of the law were designed to inform the public, voters who believe they have been wrongfully denied information under FECA have both suffered an injury-in-fact, and fit comfortably within the law’s zone of interests. The Court declined, however, to reach the second question presented — whether the FEC had properly limited the statutory definition of a “political committee” to organizations whose “major purpose” was the election of candidates — because the FEC had in the interim changed the relevant regulations in a manner that could, conceivably, moot the case. The Court therefore remanded the matter to the court of appeals for reconsideration in light of the new administrative rules. The ACLU submitted an amicus brief arguing that the “major purpose” test applied by the FEC was not only correct, but constitutionally compelled.
In Hohn v. United States, 66 U.S.L.W. 4489 (July 15, 1998) (5-4), the Court held that it has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1254 to entertain a petition for certiorari from the denial of a certificate of appealability by the court of appeals in a habeas proceeding.
In City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons, 66 U.S.L.W. 4041 (Dec. 15, 1997)(7-2), the Court held that a state court challenge to the city’s landmark designation of plaintiff’s property was properly removed by the city to federal court since plaintiffs had raised federal constitutional issues, including a Takings Clause claim. Once removed, the majority held, the federal court could exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state administrative claims, even though those claims required the federal court to engage in a factual review of the administrative record. In dissent, Justices Ginsburg and Stevens characterized the majority opinion as a “watershed decision,” id. at 4046, because of its potential to place many state administrative appeals in federal court.
In Rivet v. Regions Bank of Louisiana, 66 U.S.L.W. 4132 (Feb. 24, 1998)(9-0), the Court unanimously held that a defendant may not remove a state law complaint to federal court on the theory that plaintiff’s state law claims are precluded by a prior federal judgment. Writing for the Court, Justice Ginsburg pointed out that claim preclusion is an affirmative defense, and removal is only proper if the federal question is presented on the face of the complaint. Justice Ginsburg also cautioned, however, that the “artful pleading” rule prevents a plaintiff from defeating removal by omitting a necessary federal question. For example, if a state law claim is preempted by federal law, removal is proper even if the complaint does not refer to federal law because, by definition, the claim can only arise under federal law.
In Wisconsin v. Schact, 66 U.S.L.W. 4531 (June 22, 1998) (9-0), a unanimous Court ruled that a complaint “arising under” federal law may be removed to federal court even though some of plaintiff’s claims are barred in federal court by the Eleventh Amendment. As Justice Breyer explained: “A State’s proper assertion of an Eleventh Amendment bar after removal means that the federal court cannot hear the barred claim. But that circumstance does not destroy removal jurisdiction over the remaining claims . . . .” Id. at 4534.
Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. Miller,
66 U.S.L.W. 4416 (May 26, 1998)
Almendarez-Torres v. United States,
66 U.S.L.W. 4213 (March 24, 1998)
Arkansas Educational Television Comm’n v. Forbes,
66 U.S.L.W. 4360 (May 18, 1998)
Baker v. General Motors Corp.,
66 U.S.L.W. 4060 (Jan. 13, 1998)
Bates v. United States,
66 U.S.L.W. 4006 (Nov. 4, 1997)
Bogan v .Scott-Harris,
66 U.S.L.W. 4163 (March 3, 1998)
Bousley v. United States,
66 U.S.L.W. 4346 (May 18, 1998)
Bragdon v. Abbott,
66 U.S.L.W. 4601 (June 25, 1998)
Brogan v. United States,
66 U.S.L.W. 4111 (Jan. 26, 1998)
Bryan v. United States,
66 U.S.L.W. 4475 (June 15, 1998)
Buchanan v. Angelone,
66 U.S.L.W. 4075 (Jan. 21, 1998)
Burlington Industries v. Ellerth,
66 U.S.L.W. 4634 (June 26, 1998)
Calderon v. Ashmus,
66 U.S.L.W. 4382 (May 26, 1998)
Calderon v. Thompson,
66 U.S.L.W. 4301 (April 29, 1998)
Campbell v. Louisiana,
66 U.S.L.W. 4258 (April 21, 1998)
Caron v. United States,
66 U.S.L.W. 4511 (June 22, 1998)
City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons,
66 U.S.L.W. 4041 (Dec. 15, 1997)
City of Monroe v. United States,
66 U.S.L.W. 3351 (Nov. 14, 1997)
Clinton v. New York,
66 U.S.L.W. 4543 (June 25, 1998)
County of Sacramento v. Lewis,
66 U.S.L.W. 4407 (May 26, 1998)
Crawford-el v. Britton,
66 U.S.L.W. 4311 (May 4, 1998)
Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel,
66 U.S.L.W. 4566 (June 25, 1998)
Edwards v. United States,
66 U.S.L.W. 4293 (April 26, 1998)
Faragher v. Boca Raton,
66 U.S.L.W. 4643 (June 26, 1998)
Federal Election Comm’n v. Akins,
66 U.S.L.W. 4426 (June 1, 1998)
Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc.,
66 U.S.L.W. 4245 (March 31, 1998)
Foster v. Love,
66 U.S.L.W. 4015 (Dec. 2, 1997)
Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District,
66 U.S.L.W. 4501 (June 22, 1998)
General Electric Co. v. Joiner,
66 U.S.L.W. 4036 (Dec. 15, 1997)
George v. Voinovich,
66 U.S.L.W. 3619 (March 23, 1998)
Gray v. Maryland,
66 U.S.L.W. 4202 (March 9, 1998)
Hetzel v. Prince William County,
66 U.S.L.W. 3618 (March 23, 1998)
Hohn v. United States,
66 U.S.L.W. 4489 (July 15, 1998)
Hopkins v. Reeves,
66 U.S.L.W. 4449 (June 8, 1998)
Hudson v. United States,
66 U.S.L.W. 4024 (Dec. 10, 1997)
Jefferson v. Tarrant,
66 U.S.L.W. 4019 (Dec. 9, 1997)
Kalina v. Fletcher,
66 U.S.L.W. 4031 (Dec. 10, 1997)
LaChance v. Erickson,
66 U.S.L.W. 4073 (Jan. 21, 1998)
Lewis v. United States,
66 U.S.L.W. 4194 (March 9, 1998)
Miller v. Albright,
66 U.S.L.W. 4266 (April 22, 1998)
Monge v. California,
66 U.S.L.W. 4628 (June 26, 1998)
Muscarello v. United States,
66 U.S.L.W. 4459 (June 8, 1998)
National Credit Union Administration v. First
National Bank & Trust Co.,
66 U.S.L.W. 4134 (Feb. 25, 1998)
National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley,
66 U.S.L.W. 4586 (June 25, 1998)
New Mexico v. Reed,
66 U.S.L.W. 3780 (June 8, 1998)
Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard,
66 U.S.L.W. 4226 (March 25, 1998)
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,
66 U.S.L.W. 4172 (March 4, 1998)
Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc.,
66 U.S.L.W. 4118 (Jan. 26, 1998)
Pennsylvania Board of Probation v. Scott,
66 U.S.L.W. 4524 (June 22, 1998)
Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corrections v. Yeskey,
66 U.S.L.W. 4481 (June 15, 1998)
Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation,
66 U.S.L.W. 4468 (June 15, 1998)
Rivet v. Regions Bank of Louisiana,
66 U.S.L.W. 4132 (Feb. 24, 1998)
Salinas v. United States,
66 U.S.L.W. 4011 (Dec. 2, 1997)
Spencer v. Kemna,
66 U.S.L.W. 4152 (March 2, 1998)
State Oil Co. v. Khan,
66 U.S.L.W. 4001 (Nov. 4, 1997)
Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better Environment,
66 U.S.L.W. 4174 (March 4, 1998)
Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal,
66 U.S.L.W. 4352 (May 18, 1998)
Swidler & Berlin v. United States,
66 U.S.L.W. 4538 (June 25, 1998)
Texas v. United States,
66 U.S.L.W. 4234 (March 31, 1998)
Trest v. Cain,
66 U.S.L.W. 4023 (Dec. 9, 1997)
United States v. Bajakajian,
66 U.S.L.W. 4514 (June 22, 1998)
United States v. Balsys,
66 U.S.L.W. 4613 (June 25, 1998)
United States v. Ramirez,
66 U.S.L.W. 4169 (March 4, 1998)
United States v. Sheffer,
66 U.S.L.W. 4235 (March 31, 1998)
Wisconsin v. Schact,
66 U.S.L.W. 4531 (June 22, 1998)
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