ACLU Summary of The 1995 Supreme Court Term
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .iii
FIRST AMENDMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
A. Freedom of Expression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
FOURTH AMENDMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
FIFTH AMENDMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
A. Double Jeopardy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
SIXTH AMENDMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
A. Trial By Jury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
SEVENTH AMENDMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
DEATH PENALTY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
EQUAL PROTECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
DUE PROCESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
COMMERCE CLAUSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
PRISONERS’ RIGHTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
MILITARY JUSTICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
VOTING RIGHTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
CENSUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
SEPARATION OF POWERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
PREEMPTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
STATUTORY DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
A. Disability Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
B. Age Discrimination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
IMMUNITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
HABEAS CORPUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
FORFEITURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
LABOR LAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
ARBITRATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
JURISDICTION AND STANDING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,
64 U.S.L.W. 4313 (May 13, 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Bailey v. U.S.,
64 U.S.L.W. 4039 (Dec. 6, 1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Behrens v. Pelletier,
64 U.S.L.W. 4081 (Feb. 21, 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . .12
Bennis v. Michigan,
64 U.S.L.W. 4124 (March 4, 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . .8, 15
BMW of North America v. Gore,
64 U.S.L.W. 4335 (May 20, 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr,
64 U.S.L.W. ____ (June 28, 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . .2
Bush v. Vera,
64 U.S.L.W. 4452 (June 13, 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . .9, 10
Carlisle v. United States,
64 U.S.L.W. 4293 (Apr. 29, 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Commission, 64 U.S.L.W. 4663 (June 26, 1996) . . 1
Cooper v. Oklahoma,
64 U.S.L.W. 4255 (April 16, 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Dalton v. Family Planning Services,
64 U.S.L.W. 3622 (Mar. 18, 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . .5, 10
Degen v. United States,
64 U.S.L.W. 4413 (June 10, 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
Denver Area Educational Telecommunications
Consortium (DAETC) v. FCC,
64 U.S.L.W. ____ (June 28, 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . .2
Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto,
64 U.S.L.W. 4370 (May 20, 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 16
Felker v. Turpin,
64 U.S.L.W. ____ (June 28, 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner,
64 U.S.L.W. 4088 (Feb. 21, 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.,
64 U.S.L.W. 4607 (June 24, 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . .4
Gray v. Netherland,
64 U.S.L.W. 4531 (June 20, 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . .5, 13
Jaffee v. Redmond,
64 U.S.L.W. 4490 (June 13, 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . .16
Janklow v. Planned Parenthood,
64 U.S.L.W. 3725 (Apr. 29, 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
Koon v. United States,
64 U.S.L.W. 4512 (June 13, 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
Lane v. Pena,
64 U.S.L.W. 4541 (June 20, 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . .11, 12
Leavitt v. Jane L.,
64 U.S.L.W. 3834 (June 17, 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
Lewis v. Casey,
64 U.S.L.W. 4587 (June 24, 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
Lewis v. United States,
64 U.S.L.W. 4581 (June 24, 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
Libretti v. United States,
64 U.S.L.W. 4005 (Nov. 7, 1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 14, 15
Lonchar v. Thomas,
64 U.S.L.W. 4245 (April 1, 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . .12
Loving v. United States,
64 U.S.L.W. 4390 (June 3, 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 9, 10
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
64 U.S.L.W. 4263 Apr. 23, 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,
64 U.S.L.W. 4625 (June 26, 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
Melendez v. United States,
64 U.S.L.W. 4525 (June 17, 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
Montana v. Egelhoff,
64 U.S.L.W. 4500 (June 13, 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
Morse v. Republican Party of Virginia,
64 U.S.L.W. 4207 (Mar. 27, 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
Neal v. United States,
64 U.S.L.W. 4077 (Jan. 22, 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
NLRB v. Town & Country Electric, Inc.,
64 U.S.L.W. 4022 (Nov. 28, 1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . .16
O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.,
64 U.S.L.W. 4243 (April 1, 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
O’Hare Truck Service , Inc. v. City of Northlake,
64 U.S.L.W. ____ (June 28, 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
Ornelas v. United States,
64 U.S.L.W. 4373 (May 28, 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Co.,
64 U.S.L.W. 4379 (June 3, 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16, 17
Richards v. Jefferson County,
64 U.S.L.W. 4405 (June 10, 1966) . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
Romer v. Evans,
64 U.S.L.W. 4353 (May 20, 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Rutledge v. United States,
64 U.S.L.W. 4238 (Mar. 27, 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,
64 U.S.L.W. 4167 (Mar. 27, 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
Shaw v. Hunt,
64 U.S.L.W. 4437 (June 13, 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . .10
Thompson v. Keohane,
64 U.S.L.W. 4027 (Nov. 29, 1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . .12
Tuggle v. Netherland,
64 U.S.L.W. 3315 (October 30, 1995) . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 13
United Food & Commercial Workers Union,
Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc.,
64 U.S.L.W. 4330 (May 13, 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
United States v. Armstrong,
64 U.S.L.W. 4305 (May 13, 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 15
United States v. Ursery,
64 U.S.L.W. 4565 (June 24, 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . .3, 16
United States v. Virginia,
64 U.S.L.W. ____ (June 26, 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . .6
Whren v. United States,
64 U.S.L.W. 4409 (June 10, 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
Wisconsin v. City of New York,
64 U.S.L.W. 4153 (Mar. 20, 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . .10
Wood v. Bartholomew,
64 U.S.L.W. 3267 (Oct. 10, 1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . .7, 13
FIRST AMENDMENT
A. Freedom of ExpressionIn 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 64 U.S.L.W. 4313 (May 13, 1996)(9-0), the Court unanimously struck down a Rhode Island statute that prohibited liquor price advertising. The case is the latest in a series of cases providing enhanced constitutional protection for commercial speech. All nine justices agreed that the challenged ban was “more extensive than necessary” to serve the state’s interest in promoting temperance and thus failed the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test traditionally applied to commercial speech. Four members of the Court were prepared to go even further, arguing that a state’s paternalistic effort to regulate behavior by withholding information should always be subject to strict First Amendment scrutiny, whether or not commercial speech is involved. The ACLU submitted an amicus brief arguing that the Rhode Island statute was unconstitutional.
In Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Commission, 64 U.S.L.W. 4663 (June 26, 1996)(7-2), seven members of the Court agreed that the Colorado Republican Party could not constitutionally be sanctioned for a campaign expenditure “in connection with” the 1986 senatorial campaign that exceeded the limits set in the Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. §441a(d)(3). The Court disagreed, however, on the proper rationale. Justices Breyer, O’Connor and Souter concluded that the expenditure limits were unconstitutional as applied because there was no evidence in this record that the party’s expenditures were coordinated with the candidate. Justices Kennedy, Rehnquist and Scalia took the position that even coordinated party expenditures could not be limited under the First Amendment and, thus, would have stricken the statute as unconstitutional on its face. Justices Thomas, Rehnquist and Scalia were also prepared to invalidate the challenged provision on its face. They argued that party expenditure limits are unconstitutional even if viewed as contributions to the candidate since they regarded the risk of corruption in these circumstances as minimal. The ACLU submitted an amicus brief arguing that the expenditure limits were unconstitutional as applied and on their face.
In O’Hare Truck Service , Inc. v. City of Northlake, 64 U.S.L.W. ____ (June 28, 1996)(7-2), the Court held that independent government contractors, like government employees, are protected by the First Amendment. Accordingly, their contract with the government cannot be terminated on the basis of their political affiliation except in the rare circumstances where political affiliation is relevant to the job they perform. The ACLU represented the government contractor in this case.
In Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr, 64 U.S.L.W. ____ (June 28, 1996)(7-2), the Court held that independent government contractors are also protected against retaliatory action because they exercise their freedom of speech to criticize government officials. Adopting the familiar Pickering test that applies to government employees, the Court held that the free speech rights of government contractors must be balanced against the government’s interest in the efficient performance of government services. The Court thus specifically rejected the holding of several lower courts that independent contractors had no First Amendment rights. The ACLU submitted an amicus brief urging the Court to recognize the First Amendment rights of government contractors.
In Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium (DAETC) v. FCC, 64 U.S.L.W. ____ (June 28, 1996), a divided Court issued a fragmented decision striking down two provisions of a 1992 federal law designed to regulate “indecency” on cable, while upholding a third. In contrast to the D.C. Court of Appeals, all nine justices agreed that the federal law had to be analyzed under the First Amendment despite the fact that it purports to leave at least some censorship decisions in the hands of private cable operators. By a 7-2 vote, the Court upheld §10(a) of the Act, which “permits” cable operators to ban “indecent” programming from leased access channels. But, by a 6-3 vote, the Court struck down §10(b) of the Act, which requires cable operators to “segregate and block” any “indecent” programming allowed on lease access channels. In the Court’s view, the requirement that all “indecent” programming be confined to a single leased access channel that must be blocked unless subscribers affirmatively request access is more restrictive than necessary to serve the government’s interest in protecting children. Finally, by a 5-4 vote, the Court also struck down §10(c) of the Act, which permits cable operators to ban “indecent” programming from public access channels. The Court distinguished §10(c) from §10(a) primarily by emphasizing the differences between public and leased access in terms of their history and purpose. As Justice Kennedy pointed out in his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, the plurality opinion (written by Justice Breyer) is perhaps most remarkable for its explicit refusal to define the constitutional standard applicable in this context. The ACLU represented DAETC in this case.
In Ornelas v. United States, 64 U.S.L.W. 4373 (May 28, 1996) (8-1), the Court ruled that determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause under the Fourth Amendment involve mixed questions of law and fact that are subject to de novo review on appeal. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that independent appellate review helps to ensure consistency and clarity in the applicable legal rules. The ACLU submitted an amicus brief arguing in favor of the position ultimately adopted by the Court.
In Whren v. United States, 64 U.S.L.W. 4409 (June 10, 1996) (9-0), the Court unanimously rejected the claim that the Fourth Amendment bars “pretextual” searches. Accordingly, the Court held that the police may stop a car for a traffic violation and search for drugs even if it is clear that but for the desire to search for drugs (without probable cause) the police would not have stopped the car for the traffic violation. If this practice leads to discriminatory enforcement, Justice Scalia wrote, the motorist’s only recourse it to seek relief under the Equal Protection Clause. The ACLU submitted an amicus brief arguing that pretextual searches violated the Fourth Amendment.
FIFTH AMENDMENT
A. Double JeopardyIn Rutledge v. United States, 64 U.S.L.W. 4238 (Mar. 27, 1996)(9-0), a unanimous Court held that double jeopardy principles bar the government from using the same criminal agreement to prosecute a defendant for conspiracy to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §846, and for conducting a continuing criminal enterprise in violation of 21 U.S.C. §848. In reaching this conclusion, the Court specifically rejected the government’s contention that the defendant had not been punished twice for the same offense because he was sentenced to two concurrent life sentences.
In United States v. Ursery, 64 U.S.L.W. 4565 (June 24, 1996) (8-1),the Court ruled that civil forfeiture is not punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, and thus the government may seek criminal prosecution and civil forfeiture in separate proceedings arising out of the same offense. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist relied on the historic fiction that civil forfeiture proceedings are against the property rather than the person. The ACLU submitted an amicus brief urging the Court to apply the Double Jeopardy Clause in these circumstances.
SIXTH AMENDMENT
A. Trial By JuryIn Lewis v. United States, 64 U.S.L.W. 4581 (June 24, 1996) (7-2), the Court held that a criminal defendant who is charged with multiple offenses is not entitled to a jury trial so long as the maximum penalty for each offense does not exceed six months. In an opinion written by Justice O’Connor, the majority rejected the argument that the maximum penalty for each offense should be “aggregated” in determining whether the jury trial right applies. Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion described the majority’s reasoning as “one of the most serious incursions on the right to trial by jury in the Court’s history . . . .” Id. at 4583. He nonetheless concurred in the result because the trial judge in this case had assured the defendant before trial that he would not be sentenced to more than six months even if he was convicted of more than one offense. The ACLU submitted an amicus brief arguing that the defendant was entitled to a jury trial.
Libretti v. United States, 64 U.S.L.W. 4005 (Nov. 7, 1995) -see summary on p.14.
In Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 64 U.S.L.W. 4263 Apr. 23, 1996)(9-0), the Court unanimously concluded that questions concerning the scope of a patent, as opposed to whether or not the patent has been infringed, are properly decided by a judge rather than a jury. The Court reached this conclusion based on historical practice and “the relative interpretive skills of judges and juries . . . .” Id. at 4267.
In Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 64 U.S.L.W. 4607 (June 24, 1996)(5-4), the Court held that, under Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), a federal court in a diversity action should apply state law rules for reviewing the appropriateness of a jury award, with one caveat. In federal court, it is the trial court not the appellate court that must apply the substantive rule imposed by state law. The appellate court is then limited to reviewing the trial court’s determination under an abuse of discretion standard because of the Seventh Amendment’s general injunction against “re-examin[ing]” jury findings.
In Tuggle v. Netherland, 64 U.S.L.W. 3315 (October 30, 1995)(9-0), the Court summarily reversed a death sentence that had been based on two aggravating circumstances, one of which was declared invalid on appeal. The lower courts had held that the remaining, valid aggravating circumstance was sufficient to uphold the death sentence, citing Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983). In a per curiam opinion, however, the Court ruled that the existence of a valid aggravating circumstance did not justify imposition of the death penalty when the invalidated circumstance led the jury to consider misleading or otherwise tainted evidence in a state that requires the jury to balance aggravating circumstances against mitigating circumstances.
In Loving v. United States, 64 U.S.L.W. 4390 (June 3, 1996) (9-0), the Court unanimously upheld the President’s power to define the aggravating circumstances that entitle a court-martial to impose the death penalty on a member of the armed forces. The Court concluded that Congress had delegated this power to the President, and that the delegation did not violate separation of powers. Four members of the Court joined in a concurring opinion by Justice Stevens that expressly left open the question of whether military courts have jurisdiction to try capital crimes that are not service-related. Justice Thomas also wrote a separate opinion questioning whether military courts are subject to the same Eighth Amendment rules that apply to civilian courts in capital cases. The ACLU submitted an amicus brief supporting Loving’s separation of powers claim.
Gray v. Netherland, 64 U.S.L.W. 4531 (June 20, 1996)(5-4) — see summary on p.13.
In Janklow v. Planned Parenthood, 64 U.S.L.W. 3725 (Apr. 29, 1996), the Court denied South Dakota’s petition for certiorari to review an Eighth Circuit decision striking down the state’s parental notification law as an undue burden on the right of minors to obtain abortions. Justices Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas wrote an opinion dissenting from the denial of certiorari, which produced a responsive opinion from Justice Stevens. The exchange of opinions reveals a deep rift within the Court on the proper standard for reviewing facial challenges in abortion cases.
In Leavitt v. Jane L., 64 U.S.L.W. 3834 (June 17, 1996) (5-4), the Court summarily reversed a Tenth Circuit ruling that had struck down provisions of a Utah law governing abortions after 20 weeks of pregnancy on the theory that those provisions could not be severed from other provisions of the same law governing abortions prior to 20 weeks, which had been ruled unconstitutional. The Court then remanded the case to the Tenth Circuit to determine, for the first time, whether the post-20 week provisions could survive constitutional scrutiny under Casey. The Court itself did not express any opinion on the ultimate constitutionality of the challenged provisions. The ACLU was co-counsel for the plaintiffs in the case.
Dalton v. Family Planning Services, 64 U.S.L.W. 3622 (Mar. 18, 1996) — see summary on p.10.
In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 64 U.S.L.W. 4167 (Mar. 27, 1996)(5-4), a bitterly divided Court struck down a provision of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act that permitted tribes to sue a state in federal court if the state failed to negotiate in good faith about the creation of new casinos on Indian lands. The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that the Eleventh Amendment protects the states against suit in federal court, and that Congress may not override that protection except when acting pursuant to its Fourteenth Amendment powers. The majority also held that the existence of a “detailed remedial scheme” under the statute, id. at 4175, precluded an injunctive suit against individual state defendants under Ex Parte Young. In a lengthy dissent, Justice Souter disputed the majority’s understanding of both the Eleventh Amendment and Ex Parte Young.
In United States v. Armstrong, 64 U.S.L.W. 4305 (May 13, 1996)(8-1), the Court ruled that evidence that all 24 crack cases “closed” by the Federal Public Defenders Office in the Central District of California during 1991 involved black defendants was insufficient to entitle the black defendants in this case to discovery on their selective prosecution claim. Rather, the Court held, defendants were first required to show that other “similarly situated” white defendants had not been prosecuted for the same crime. The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, did not further explain what “similarly situated” means in this context. Justice Stevens’ dissent focused on the racially disparate impact of the federal drug laws, especially regarding crack cocaine. The ACLU submitted an amicus brief supporting defendants’ request for discovery in this case.
In Romer v. Evans, 64 U.S.L.W. 4353 (May 20, 1996)(6-3), the Court struck down an amendment to the Colorado Constitution, so-called Amendment 2, which both repealed all state and local laws that protected lesbians and gays against discrimination and prohibited their future reenactment. The majority opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, first rejected as “implausible” the state’s claim that Amendment 2 was merely designed to withhold “special rights” from gays and lesbians. Id. at 4354. Second, the Court held, Amendment 2 could not survive minimum scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause because “it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests.” Id. at 4356. As the Court explained: “[I]ts sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything other than animus toward the class it affects.” Id. The ACLU was co-counsel for the plaintiffs in this case.
In United States v. Virginia, 64 U.S.L.W. 4638 (June 26, 1996)(7-1), the Court ruled that the exclusion of women from VMI, a state-run military college, violates equal protection. The majority opinion, written by Justice Ginsburg, found that the state had failed to provide “an exceedingly persuasive justification” for its male-only admissions policy. In particular, the Court rejected the two justifications that the state had put forward. First, the Court held that VMI could not be justified as part of a comprehensive state plan to provide diverse educa tional opportunities for Virginia students. As Justice Ginsburg noted, “[h]owever `liberally’ this plan serves the State’s sons, it makes no provision whatever for its daughters.” Id. at 4645. Second, the Court concluded that VMI’s unique educational attributes would not be destroyed by the admission of women. Finally, the Court held that the state’s creation of a separate educational program for women who were denied admission to VMI did not remedy the equal protection violation since the program offered to women could not match the program, prestige or resources available to male students at VMI. The ACLU submitted an amicus brief supporting the challenge to VMI’s exclusion of women.
In Wood v. Bartholomew, 64 U.S.L.W. 3267 (Oct. 10, 1995)
(5-4), the Court summarily reversed a Ninth Circuit decision holding that the prosecution’s failure to supply the defense with the polygraph results of a key witness violated due process because it “might have” affected the defense’s preparation for trial. In a per curiam opinion, the Court ruled that such speculation did not justify a writ of habeas corpus when the prosecution’s case was otherwise overwhelming and when trial counsel conceded that the withheld polygraph results would not have altered his trial strategy.
In Cooper v. Oklahoma, 64 U.S.L.W. 4255 (April 16, 1996) (9-0), the Court unanimously held that the due process clause prohibits a state from requiring a criminal defendant to prove his incompetence by clear and convincing evidence. The Court had previously held that a state may shift the burden of proving incompetence to the defendant. The Court nevertheless saw a significant difference between a “preponderance of the evidence” standard and a “clear and convincing evidence” standard. As the Court pointed out, under Oklahoma’s heightened standard, the state “may proceed with a criminal trial after a defendant has shown that his is more likely than not incompetent.” Id. at 4257.
In BMW of North America v. Gore, 64 U.S.L.W. 4335 (May 20, 1996)(5-4), the Court struck down a $2 million punitive damage award as “grossly excessive” and thus in violation of the Due Process Clause. The majority reached this conclusion by evaluating the award against three constitutional “guideposts”: (1) the reprehensibility of the underlying conduct; (2) the ratio between the punitive damage award and the actual damages suffered by the plaintiff; and (3) the civil and criminal sanctions available for similar misconduct. In a separate concurrence, three members of the majority also pointed out the lack of any effective state law mechanism to channel the jury’s discretion.
In Richards v. Jefferson County, 64 U.S.L.W. 4405 (June 10, 1966)(9-0), the Court unanimously held that a litigant cannot be bound by the judgment in an earlier case when the litigant never received notice of the earlier case and was not adequately represented in it. Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens also made it clear that the question of adequate representation in an earlier proceeding must be strictly construed because, as a general principle, “the State may not deprive individual litigants of their own day in Court.” Id. at 4408.
In Montana v. Egelhoff, 64 U.S.L.W. 4500 (June 13, 1996) (5-4), the Court rejected the due process claim of a Montana murder defendant who had been barred by a Montana statute from introducing evidence that he was drunk at the time the crime was committed. Writing for a four-member plurality, Justice Scalia held that the Montana evidentiary rule did not offend “fundamental notions of justice”; to the contrary, he concluded, it was consistent with the prevailing common law practice. Justice Ginsburg concurred in the result, but on a different theory. In her view, the Montana statute was not an evidentiary rule but instead redefined the elements of the crime so that the defendant’s sobriety was irrelevant. Nothing in the due process clause, she wrote, prevents a state from punishing a drunk defendant as severely as a sober one. The principal dissent, written by Justice O’Connor, argued that Montana had unconstitutionally barred the defendant from presenting his defense.
Bennis v. Michigan, 64 U.S.L.W. 4124 (March 4, 1996)(5-4) — see summary on p.15.
In Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 64 U.S.L.W. 4088 (Feb. 21, 1996)(9-0), the Court unanimously struck down a North Carolina taxing scheme under the Commerce Clause. Under the invalidated statute, North Carolina residents who owned shares in out-of-state corporations were required to pay a higher tax than North Carolina residents who owned shares of equal value in-state corporations. The Court noted that state laws that facially discriminate against interstate commerce are presumptively invalid. The Court also reiterated that any state justification for such discriminatory treatment is subject to strict scrutiny.
In Lewis v. Casey, 64 U.S.L.W. 4587 (June 24, 1996)(8-1), the Court reversed significant portions of an injunction designed to provide Arizona prisoners with meaningful “access to the courts.” Narrowly interpreting its prior ruling in Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977), the Court held that even the total absence of a prison law library does not violate the Constitution unless an individual prisoner can show that he or she was effectively barred from pursuing a “nonfrivolous” legal claim as a result, and thus suffered an “actual injury.” Id. at 4589. The Court also held that a system-wide injunction is inappropriate absent proof of system-wide problems. Finally, the majority suggested that the Constitution only protects a right of access to the Court and not a right to “discover grievances” or “to litigate effectively once in court.” Id. at 4589. Four members of the Court dissented from this last limitation on Bounds, as well as from the principle that the right of access to court depends on a threshold determination that the prisoner’s claim is nonfrivolous. Only Justice Stevens, however, broadly dissented from the majority’s restrictive interpretation of prisoners’ rights. The ACLU represented the plaintiff prisoners in this case.
Loving v. United States, 64 U.S.L.W. 4390 (June 3, 1996) — see summary on p.4.
In Morse v. Republican Party of Virginia, 64 U.S.L.W. 4207 (Mar. 27, 1996)(5-4), the Court ruled that the decision by Virginia’s Republican Party to impose a $35 registration fee for participation in the nominating convention where it chose its candidate for U.S. Senator was subject to preclearance under §5 of the Voting Rights Act. In separate plurality opinions, Justices Stevens and Breyer relied heavily on the White Primary Cases as justification for their interpretations of the Voting Rights Act. The Court also held that individual voters are entitled to bring suit under §10 of the Voting Rights Act, which bars imposition of a poll tax. The ACLU submitted an amicus brief supporting the challenge in this case under both sections 5 and 10.
In Bush v. Vera, 64 U.S.L.W. 4452 (June 13, 1996)(5-4), the Court declared three majority-minority districts in Texas unconstitutional on the ground that race was a “predominant” factor in the way that the districts were drawn, and that the use of race in drawing the districts was not “narrowly tailored” to avoid a violation of §2 of the Voting Rights Act (which prohibits the “dilution” of minority voting strength) because the new districts were not “compact.” The plurality opinion, written by Justice O’Connor, concluded that race was a “predominant” factor despite substantial evidence that incumbency protection also played an important role in the Texas redistricting plan. The four dissenters all disagreed with the Court’s use of strict scrutiny in these challenges to majority-minority districts. Justice Stevens also disputed the Court’s evaluation of the factual record and the role that race played in the state’s redistricting decisions. Justice Souter emphasized the significant confusion that has been created by the Court’s voting rights jurisprudence.
In Shaw v. Hunt, 64 U.S.L.W. 4437 (June 13, 1996)(5-4), the Court struck down the 12th Congressional District in North Carolina as an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. Extending its 1993 holding in Shaw I, the Court held that the “bizarre” shape of the majority-minority district disregarded traditional redistricting practices and thus triggered strict scrutiny. As in Vera, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion held that the challenged district could not be justified as a response to a general history of racial discrimination in North Carolina, nor could its “bizarre” shape be justified by reliance on §2 of the Voting Rights Act. Justice Stevens ended his dissenting opinion by observing: “I [do not] see how our constitutional tradition can countenance the suggestion that a State may draw unsightly lines to favor farmers or city dwellers, but not to create districts that benefit the very group whose history inspired the Amendment that the Voting Rights Act was designed to implement.” Id. at 4452. The ACLU submitted an amicus brief supporting the challenged district.
In Wisconsin v. City of New York, 64 U.S.L.W. 4153 (Mar. 20, 1996)(9-0), the Court unanimously rejected the claim that the Constitution required the Secretary of Commerce to make a statistical adjustment for the conceded undercount in the 1990 census, which disproportionately disfavored minorities. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist held that any disproportionate racial impact was not intentional (and thus did not trigger the Equal Protection Clause), and that the strict scrutiny required in intra-state districting cases to justify any departure from the one person, one vote rule did not apply to the census. Rather, the Court ruled, the critical question is whether the Secretary’s decision on how to conduct the census, bears a “reasonable relationship” to the constitutional goal of “an actual enumeration.” Id. at 4158. Here, the Court found that standard had been met. The ACLU submitted an amicus brief supporting New York’s request for a statistical adjustment.
Loving v. United States, 64 U.S.L.W. ____ (June 3, 1996) — see summary on p.4.
In Dalton v. Family Planning Services, 64 U.S.L.W. 3622 (March 18, 1996)(9-0), the Supreme Court unanimously ruled, in a per curiam opinion, that the Eighth Circuit had gone too far in invalidating “in its entirety” an Arkansas law that denied public funding for abortions except when necessary to save the mother’s life. The Court assumed, without deciding, that the Eighth Circuit was correct in holding that the Arkansas law conflicted with the 1994 Hyde Amendment, which extended federal medicaid funding to abortions resulting from an act of rape or incest. But, the Court held, the Arkansas law should only have been invalidated to that extent. For example, the Court pointed out, the Hyde Amendment has no relevance to state programs that are not supported by federal funds. Because there is no conflict in that instance, the Court held, there should be no preemption.
In Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 64 U.S.L.W. 4625 (June 26, 1996) (5-4), the Court held that the federal Medical Device Amendments Act of 1976, which created a role for the FDA in approving medical devices, does not preempt common law tort actions when those medical devices are defective. The majority opinion by Justice Stevens relied, in part, on the rule that a congressional intent to preempt state law must be clearly expressed, especially in a traditional field of state regulation, like health and safety.
Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 64 U.S.L.W. 4370 (May 20, 1996)(8-1) — see summary on p.16.
STATUTORY DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
A. Disability RightsIn Lane v. Pena, 64 U.S.L.W. 4541 (June 20, 1996)(7-2), the Court ruled that the federal government cannot be sued for damages under §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 because the text of the statute does not explicitly waive the federal government’s sovereign immunity. In reaching this result, Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion largely ignored the statute’s purpose and history. Justice Stevens, who dissented, responded by noting: “When judge-made rules [of statutory construction] require Congress to use its valuable time enacting and reenacting provisions whose original intent was clear to all but the most skeptical and hostile reader, the rules should be discarded.” Id. at 4548. The ACLU represented the plaintiff in this case.
B. Age Discrimination
In O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 64 U.S.L.W. 4243 (April 1, 1996)(9-0), the Court unanimously ruled that the fact that an employee over 40 is replaced by someone “substantially younger,” id. at 4244, creates an inference of discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, even if the replacement employee is also over 40 and thus within the statute’s protected class. As Justice Scalia summarized the Court’s holding: “The fact that one person in the protected class has lost out to another person in the protected class is . . . irrelevant, so long as he has lost out because of his age.” Id. (emphasis in original).
In Behrens v. Pelletier, 64 U.S.L.W. 4081 (Feb. 21, 1996) (7-2), the Court reversed a Ninth Circuit rule that barred government defendants raising a qualified immunity defense from pursuing more than a single interlocutory appeal. Relying heavily on its prior decision in Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1995), the Court explicitly upheld the right of a government defendant to seek interlocutory review of an adverse qualified immunity decision at both the motion to dismiss and summary judgment stages. In dissent, Justice Breyer wrote that “each added appeal . . . pose[s] an ever-increasing threat to the appearance of justice in civil rights cases.” Id. at 4088.
Lane v. Pena, 64 U.S.L.W. 4541 (June 20, 1996)(7-2) — see
summary on p.11.
In Thompson v. Keohane, 64 U.S.L.W. 4027 (Nov. 29, 1995)
(7-2), the Court concluded that the determination of whether a suspect is “in custody” during a police interrogation, and therefore entitled to Miranda warnings, is a mixed question of fact and law rather than a purely factual judgment. Accordingly, the Court held, a state court’s judgment on the “in custody” question is not entitled to a presumption of correctness but, instead, must be subject to de novo review by a federal court in habeas proceedings.
In Lonchar v. Thomas, 64 U.S.L.W. 4245 (April 1, 1996)(9-0), the Court unanimously held that a first federal habeas petition cannot be dismissed based on “abuse of the writ” grounds even if it was filed at the eleventh hour, as in this case. Instead, the Court held, the Habeas Rules require a finding, not made here, that the prisoner’s delay in filing the petition “prejudiced” the state by impairing its ability to respond. The Court also unanimously ruled that it was wrong to deny a stay of execution in this capital case, although the Court split 5-4 on its reasoning. Writing for five members of the Court, Justice Breyer took the position that the standard for denying a stay and dismissing a first petition were necessarily the same in a capital case — i.e., required a showing of prejudice — or else the execution would inevitably moot the petition. Writing a separate concurrence for four members of the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that a stay could be denied on a finding that a delayed petition represented an abuse of the writ regardless of prejudice (and despite the fact that denial of a stay would result in execution of the prisoner), but that no finding of abuse was made below.
In Gray v. Netherland, 64 U.S.L.W. 4531 (June 20, 1996) (5-4), the Court held that a death row inmate was not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus based on the state’s failure to provide him with adequate notice of the evidence it intended to use at the penalty phase of his trial. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist characterized the proposition that due process requires adequate notice in these circumstances as a “new rule” of law that could not be applied for the first time in a habeas proceeding. The majority also concluded that the record was inadequate to determine whether Gray’s claim that the state had misrepresented the evidence it intended to rely on during the penalty phase was adequately preserved. On this latter issue, therefore, the case was remanded for further proceedings. Justice Ginsburg’s dissent rejected the majority’s effort to bifurcate Gray’s due process claim. She further argued that “[t]here is nothing ‘new’ in a rule that capital defendants must be afforded a meaningful opportunity to defend against the state’s penalty phase evidence.” Id. at 4540.
In Felker v. Turpin, 64 U.S.L.W. ____ (June 28, 1996)(9-0), the Court reviewed recently enacted provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which altered both the procedures and substantive standards governing successive habeas petitions. The Court unanimously concluded that nothing in the Act precluded the Court from exercising its original jurisdiction to hear habeas claims. Thus, despite the fact that the Act eliminated the Court’s certiorari jurisdiction over certain adverse decisions by the lower courts in successive habeas cases, the Court decided that it did not have to reach the ultimate constitutional question of whether Congress could entirely eliminate the Court’s appellate jurisdiction over a category of cases without violating Article III. On the other hand, the Court held that the restrictive substantive standards adopted by Congress in the Act for successive habeas petitions also “inform[ed the Court’s] consideration of original habeas petitions.” Id. at ____. Applying these new restrictive standards, the Court then denied petitioner’s request for habeas relief. The ACLU filed an amicus brief arguing, as the Court ultimately found, that the new Act did not deprive the Court of its original jurisdiction in habeas cases.
Wood v. Bartholomew, 64 U.S.L.W. 3267 (Oct. 10, 1995) — see summary on p.7.
Tuggle v. Netherland, 64 U.S.L.W. 3315 (October 30, 1995) — see summary on p.4.
In Libretti v. United States, 64 U.S.L.W. 4005 (Nov. 7, 1995)(8-1), the Court ruled that a federal district judge need not inquire into the factual basis for a criminal forfeiture agreement because forfeiture relates to sentencing rather than guilt and Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(f) is therefore inapplicable. The Court similarly ruled that a defendant could waive his statutory right to a jury determination on the forfeiture issues under Fed.R.Crim.P. 31(e) by entering a guilty plea even if the plea agreement did specifically refer to the jury trial right. In reaching this conclusion, six justices of the Court rejected the argument that the Sixth Amendment would require a jury trial on forfeiture even in the absence of a statute.
In Bailey v. U.S., 64 U.S.L.W. 4039 (Dec. 6, 1995)(9-0), a unanimous Court held that mere possession of a gun is not enough to trigger the enhanced penalties provided in 18 U.S.C. §924(c)(1) for any person who “uses or carries a firearm” while committing a “crime of violence or drug trafficking crime.” Rather, the government must show that the gun was “actively employed” by the defendant. This showing, however, can be made in a variety of ways. As Justice O’Connor explained: “The active-employment understanding of ‘use’ certainly includes brandishing, displaying, bartering, striking with, and most obviously, firing or attempting to fire, a firearm.” Id. at 4042.
In Neal v. United States, 64 U.S.L.W. 4077 (Jan. 22, 1996) (9-0), the Court unanimously ruled that a change in the method of weighing LSD under the Sentencing Guidelines, which potentially reduced the applicable sentence for all LSD crimes, could not reduce the mandatory minimum established by Congress. The Court’s opinion also stressed the importance of stare decisis in statutory construction cases. Otherwise, Justice Kennedy wrote, “Congress would have less reason to exercise its responsibility to correct statutes that are thought to be unwise or unfair. 64 U.S.L.W. at 4080.
In Koon v. United States, 64 U.S.L.W. 4512 (June 13, 1996) (9-0), the Court unanimously ordered a review of the sentence imposed on the two police defendants in this well-publicized case. The Court also unanimously ruled that the district court’s decision to give the defendants a shorter sentence than the federal sentencing guidelines would normally provide was subject to review under an abuse of discretion standard rather than the de novo review that the Ninth Circuit applied in this case. The case was nevertheless remanded for resentencing since all nine justices agreed that at least some of the factors relied on by the district court for its “downward departure” were an abuse of discretion (although they disagreed on which ones).
In Melendez v. United States, 64 U.S.L.W. 4525 (June 17, 1996)(7-2), the Court held that a district judge can impose a sentence below the statutory minimum only with the prosecutor’s consent under 18 U.S.C. §3553(e), and that a motion by federal prosecutors to impose a lower sentence than the Sentencing Guidelines would normally require is not sufficient to waive the statutory minimum.
In Carlisle v. United States, 64 U.S.L.W. 4293 (Apr. 29, 1996)(7-2), the Court held that a district court lacked authority to grant a post-verdict motion for acquittal based on insufficient evidence filed one day after the seven day deadline stipulated in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c). The dissent argued that a district judge always has “inherent authority” to prevent the conviction of an innocent defendant. The majority, however, rejected the contention that a district court’s inherent authority allowed it to disregard an unambiguous federal rule, at least in the circumstances of this case.
United States v. Armstrong, 64 U.S.L.W. 4305 (May 13, 1996) (8-1) — see summary on p.__.
In Bennis v. Michigan, 64 U.S.L.W. 4124 (March 4, 1996)
(5-4), the Court rejected the due process claim of a woman whose car had been forfeited after her husband, who jointly owned the car, had used it to solicit a prostitute. Adopting a narrow interpretation of the “innocent owner” defense, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion held that the state may seize property used for illegal purposes (so long as it has not been stolen) even if the owner was unaware of the manner in which the property was being used. The majority also rejected the wife’s claim under the Takings Clause on the theory that the state does not have to compensate for property that it is entitled to seize.
In Degen v. United States, 64 U.S.L.W. 4413 (June 10, 1996) (9-0), the Court unanimously held that a federal trial judge may not rely on “inherent authority” to deny an alleged drug dealer the right to participate in a civil forfeiture proceeding (and thus uphold the government’s right to seize the property) merely because the alleged drug dealer is a fugitive from parallel criminal proceedings. At the same time, the Court reserved judgment on whether the legislature could accomplish the same result through a properly drawn statute.
Libretti v. United States, 64 U.S.L.W. 4005 (Nov. 7, 1995) (8-1) — see summary on p.14.
United States v. Ursery, 64 U.S.L.W. 4565 (June 24, 1996) (8-1) — see summary on p.3.
In Jaffee v. Redmond, 64 U.S.L.W. 4490 (June 13, 1996)(7-2), the Court joined all 50 states in recognizing the existence of a psychotherapist-patient privilege. Interpreting Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Court further held that the privilege applies to licensed social workers, as well as to psychiatrists and psychologists. Finally, the Court rejected the “balancing test” adopted by the Seventh Circuit in this case, which weighed the patient’s interest in privacy against the evidentiary value of the testimony in each case. As the Court pointed out in an opinion written by Justice Stevens, “an uncertain privilege . . . is little better than no privilege at all.” Id. at 4494 (citations omitted). The ACLU submitted an amicus brief supporting recognition of the psychotherapist-patient privilege in federal court.
In NLRB v. Town & Country Electric, Inc., 64 U.S.L.W. 4022 (Nov. 28, 1995)(9-0), the Court unanimously agreed with the NLRB that paid union organizers who seek employment for the purpose of unionizing the employer are still “employees” within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act and, as employees, are protected against unfair labor practices, including anti-union discrimination. The ACLU filed an amicus brief endorsing the interpretation of the Act adopted by the NLRB and upheld by the Court.
In Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 64 U.S.L.W. 4370 (May 20, 1996)(8-1), the Court struck down a Montana statute forbidding the enforcement of an arbitration clause unless it is printed on the first page of the contract, underlined and in capitals, on the grounds that the state law was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act, which does not contain a similar requirement.
Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Co., 64 U.S.L.W. 4379 (June 3, 1996) — see summary on p.17.
In United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc., 64 U.S.L.W. 4330 (May 13, 1996)(9-0), the Court unanimously held that the standing requirements of Article III do not prevent Congress from authorizing a union to sue for damages on behalf of its members when a company closes a plant without the 60 day notice required by the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN). The Court acknowledged that previous decisions had suggested that the notion of associational was appropriate only in equitable cases and not when individual damages were sought. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that this limitation on associational standing was a judicially created prudential rule that was not mandated by Article III. Thus, it could be overridden by Congress.
In Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Co., 64 U.S.L.W. 4379 (June 3, 1996)(9-0), a unanimous Court ruled that a district order remanding an arbitration case to state court on abstention grounds is appealable under the collateral order doctrine (even though most remand orders are non-appealable). On the merits, the Court then ruled that abstention has different consequences in an action for damages than in an action for injunctive relief. In the latter case, it may justify dismissal of the federal court proceeding; in the former instance, it can at most justify a stay of the federal court proceedings. Since this was a damages action, dismissal was therefore inappropriate.
Stay Informed
Every month, you'll receive regular roundups of the most important civil rights and civil liberties developments. Remember: a well-informed citizenry is the best defense against tyranny.